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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes two essays on corporate finance. The first essay investigates
why bank debt contracts are frequently renegotiated outside default. I test empirical im-
plications from several theories by looking at bondholder wealth effects in a sample of
firms with both bank debt and public bonds in their capital structure. Based on a sample
of 321 renegotiations, I find that bondholders react positively to renegotiations that result
in relaxation of bank debt covenants. The evidence supports the theory that lenders loosen
covenants due to new favorable information of firms’ credit quality and is inconsistent
with the hypothesis that relaxing covenants signals weakened bank monitoring due to low
bargaining power of the banks. I also find insignificant bondholder reaction to renegotiated
higher bank loan interest rates. This provides little support to the hypothesis that increased
loan interest rate conveys unfavorable news that asset substitution cannot be avoided.
The second essay, coauthored with Shane Johnson and Jun Zhang, examines the re-
lationship between CEO inside debt and the maturity of new corporate debt. Following
recent theories of incentive alignment effect of CEO inside debt, we include both the mag-
nitude and the maturity of CEO inside debt in empirical estimation. We classify firms as
having “debt-biased CEOs” when the ratio of CEO’s inside debt to equity compensation
exceeds the company’s leverage ratio, and “equity-biased CEOs” otherwise. Using a sam-
ple of corporate debt issuance during 2007-2012, we find that among firms with long-term
inside debt, firms with debt-biased CEOs issue debt with longer maturity than do firms
with equity-biased CEOs. Among firms with debt-biased CEOs, the maturity of new debt
is longer if CEOs have long-term inside debt than if CEOs have short-term inside debt.
In contrast, among firms with equity-biased CEOs, the maturity of new debt is shorter if
a CEO has long-term inside debt than if a CEO has short-term inside debt. The results
ii
provide support for the overall hypothesis that CEO inside debt affects firms debt maturity
structure through its ability to ameliorate stockholder-debtholder conflicts.
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION
Corporate finance has long been characterizing the firm as a nexus of contracts since
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)). This view has motivated a great amount of research on
understanding and characterizing different contractual issues among firms’ owners, man-
agers, and their investors. For example, the conflicts between a firm’s stockholders and
debtholders, the allocation of control rights via bank loan covenants, to name but two. The
ultimate purpose of these analyses is to come up with efficient contracting devices that help
better align interests among various economic agents. In this dissertation, I examine two
of these contracting mechanisms by understanding the economic mechanism underlying
the renegotiation of bank debt contracts that occurs outside of states of distress or default
and by investigating the incentive alignment effect of CEO debt-like compensation.
In the first essay, “Bank Debt Renegotiation and Bondholders’ Wealth”, I uses bond-
holder wealth effects to test several theories of why bank debt contracts are renegotiated
using a sample of firms with both bank debt and public bonds in their capital structure.
These theories postulate several potential explanations for bank debt renegotiation, and
have empirical implications for the impact of a renegotiation on bond returns. Gaˆrleanu
and Zwiebel (2009) argue that initially strict covenants that can be later relaxed upon rev-
elation of good information enable “good-type” firms to reduce ex ante financing frictions
associated with asymmetric information. Their theory thus suggests that bond returns
should be positively correlated with loosening covenants in bank debt. I find that bond
value increases 34 basis points when renegotiated loan covenants are loosened, strongly
supporting Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009) and casting doubt on the alternative hypothesis
that such loosening typically signals a weakening bank monitoring. The model of gorton00
asserts that a bank debt renegotiation that increases the interest rate conveys unfavorable
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news that asset substitution cannot be avoided. Hence, Gorton and Kahn (2000) imply that
there should be a negative relation between bond value changes and an increased renego-
tiated bank debt interest rate. I find little evidence of the negative relation. Further tests
show that this is explained by firms’ more conservative investment decision after renego-
tiation.
In the second essay, “CEO Inside Debt and the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues”,
co-authored with Shane Johnson and Jun Zhang, we examine the association between
CEO inside debt and the maturity of new corporate debt issues. We incorporate into the
estimation both the magnitude and the maturity of CEO inside debt, as theory (Edmans
and Liu (2011)) emphasizes that the incentive alignment effect of CEO inside debt relies
critically on the two dimensions. In a sample of 4,399 new corporate debt issues during
2007-2012, we find support for this theoretical claim. Among firms with long-term inside
debt, firms whose CEOs have debt-biased inside debt levels issue debt with a maturity
of approximately one year longer than firms with equity-biased debt. Given a sample
median maturity of 5 years, the effect of debt bias is an approximately 20% increase in
the maturity. Among firms with debt-biased levels of inside debt, firms whose CEOs have
long-term inside debt issue corporate debt with more than a half year longer maturity than
do firms whose CEOs have short-term inside debt. Finally, among firms with equity-
biased levels of inside debt, we find significantly one-year shorter maturity of new issues
for firms with long-term inside debt compared to those with short-term inside debt. The
findings are more pronounced for firms with higher market-to-book ratio and are robust to
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at firm level. The results provide support for the
overall hypothesis that CEO inside debt affects firms’ debt maturity structure through its
ability to ameliorate stockholder-debtholder conflicts.
2
2. BANK DEBT RENEGOTIATION AND BONDHOLDERS’ WEALTH
This chapter uses bondholder wealth effects to test several theories of why bank debt
contracts are renegotiated using a sample of firms with both bank debt and public bonds
in their capital structure. These theories postulate several potential explanations for bank
debt renegotiation, and have empirical implications for the impact of a renegotiation on
bond returns. Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009) argue that initially strict covenants that can be
later relaxed upon revelation of good information enable “good-type” firms to reduce ex
ante financing frictions associated with asymmetric information. Their theory thus sug-
gests that bond returns should be positively correlated with loosening covenants in bank
debt. I find that bond value increases 34 basis points when renegotiated loan covenants are
loosened, strongly supporting Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009) and casting doubt on the alter-
native hypothesis that such loosening typically signals a weakening bank monitoring. The
model of Gorton and Kahn (2000) asserts that a bank debt renegotiation that increases the
interest rate conveys unfavorable news that asset substitution cannot be avoided. Hence,
Gorton and Kahn (2000) imply that there should be a negative relation between bond value
changes and an increased renegotiated bank debt interest rate. I find little evidence of the
negative relation. Further tests show that this is explained by firms’ more conservative
investment decision after renegotiation.
The motivation for examining the interaction between loan agreement renegotiations
and bondholders’ wealth comes from the recent empirical evidence that bank loan renego-
tiation is not peculiar to financial distress or (technical) default. It frequently takes place
in the ordinary course of business and involves substantial modifications to amount, ma-
turity, interest rate and covenants (Roberts and Sufi (2009b), Roberts (2015), Denis and
Wang (2014)). While a rich set of theoretical models seek to explain why debt contract
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renegotiation happens, which of these economic mechanisms drives this phenomenon re-
mains largely unexamined in the empirical literature. This study seeks to fill this void by
examining bondholder wealth effects.
I focus my empirical design on bond price reactions because of a common feature
among all the theories under examination: renegotiations are driven by the arrival of new
information to the bank about credit quality. Furthermore, much of this new information is
likely to be known only to the bank prior to the renegotiation, since it is well-established in
the literature that banks possess considerable private information about credit quality that
is not available to the holders of bonds and other securities.1 Hence bond price reactions
to renegotiations are likely to reflect the banks new credit-related information that resulted
in the renegotiation.2 In contrast, stock price reactions are a less precise indicator of
new information about credit quality revealed during renegotiation, since stock prices are
driven by many factors other than credit quality. In addition, any observed renegotiated
contractual change is voluntary and hence favored by stockholders, provided that managers
act in stockholders interests (Roberts and Sufi (2009b)).3 Hence stock price reactions are
likely to be positive for all renegotiations, making it difficult to use stock price reactions
to test different theories.4 In contrast, bondholders have no say in these renegotiations,
so bondholder wealth effects could be positive or negative ex ante, depending on which
theory of renegotiation is more empirically relevant.
In particular, theory suggests that the loosening of bank debt covenants could lead to
1See, for instance, Kane and Malkiel (1965), Fama (1985), Sharpe (1990), and Rajan (1992) for theory.
On the empirical side, James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992),
Best and Zhang (1993), Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995), and Maskara and Mullineaux (2011), among
others, study loan announcement effect in the equity market. Dass and Massa (2011) examine the possibility
that banks exploit its informational advantage in the equity market.
2It would be interesting to study loan price reaction around these renegotiations. However, secondary
market loan pricing data is not readily available on a large-sample basis.
3I exclude renegotiations when firms experience covenant violation in the same year. As covenant viola-
tion typically is very costly to the managers, banks probably have dominant influence in these renegotiations.
4Nevertheless, stock price reactions can provide additional insights into one of my hypotheses. See
Section 2.3.4 for detail.
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either positive or negative bond returns. On the one hand, banks’ rent extraction of the
borrower due to their information monopoly depends on the relative bargaining power of
banks vs. borrowers (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992)). This still holds for firms with access
to public debt, as Johnson (1997) shows that this group of firms still systematically use
bank debt and use it in the same manner as the average firm in his sample. Banks could
plausibly be willing to relax covenants in states where their bargaining power declines in
exchange for retaining the lending relationship and associated future rents. Indeed, Allen
and Peristiani (2007) provide hard evidence consistent with the anecdotes that “Banks
are using loans like a loss leader, a teaser product to entice corporations into giving the
bank more lucrative stock-and-bond underwriting or merger advisory business.”5 Relaxing
covenants, however, is costly to bondholders because of increased default risk and reduced
recovery rate by weakened monitoring of loosening covenants (Smith and Warner (1979),
Rajan and Winton (1995), Zhang (2009), Demiroglu and James (2010)). The incentive to
increase loans’ risk could be even amplified by the limited liability of the lead arrangers
granted in the loan agreements (Ivashina (2007)). As bondholders do not benefit from any
rents that banks extract, bondholders are expected to react negatively to renegotiations that
relax covenants.
On the other hand, Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009) propose that strict ex ante bank debt
covenants and ex post renegotiation offer an optimal contracting mechanism to overcome
the adverse selection effect in the loan market. Their model posits that lenders are willing
to transfer control rights back to the firm upon acquiring favorable information on the
credit quality of the firms. Hence their model implies that a firm’s bondholders should
react positively to bank debt renegotiations that relax covenants.
This chapter contributes to the relatively young empirical literature on the renegotiation
5Jonathan Sapsford, “Banks Give Wall Street a Run for its Money”, January 5, 2004.
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of bank loan agreements outside of financial distress or default.6 Roberts and Sufi (2009b)
are the first to document the prevalence of renegotiations in the U.S. bank loan market
that typically result in substantial modifications to amount, maturity, and interest rate in a
debt contract. Roberts (2015) takes a dynamic view and focuses on the effect of informa-
tion asymmetry in the lending relationship over the life of the contract. Denis and Wang
(2014) complement Roberts and Sufi (2009b) by documenting that bank debt covenants
are also frequently renegotiated, most of which are likely to get loosened instead of tight-
ened. They further show that firms’ post-renegotiation investment and financing activities
are strongly associated with how the covenant is renegotiated. This literature, however,
is largely silent on the value consequences of these voluntary renegotiation of bank debt
contracts.7 To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to systematically examine
value effect of voluntary bank debt renegotiations, from the perspective of a firm’s bond-
holders. The study also provides some of the first empirical tests of several recent theories
on the renegotiation of debt contracts.
This chapter is related to the literature on the determinants and implications of covenant
design in debt contracts. A large body of research finds that strict covenants help mit-
igate agency and informational problems over the investment and financing policies of
the firm (see, e.g., Bradley and Roberts (2004), Drucker and Puri (2009), Zhang (2009),
and Demiroglu and James (2010) on private debt, and Billett, King, and Mauer (2007)
on public debt). Recently, Murfin (2012) shows that the strictness of the loan contract
that a borrower receives is partly determined by supply-side considerations. These studies
6Most prior empirical research on debt contract renegotiation focuses on states of either default, financial
distress or bankruptcy. (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995), Chen and Wei (1993), Smith (1993), Chava and
Roberts (2008), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012), and Roberts and Sufi (2009c)
examine the consequence of technical default. Gilson (1990), Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), Asquith,
Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), and Benmelech and Bergman (2008) study the renegotiation outcome in
payment default and bankruptcy. Also see Roberts and Sufi (2009a) for a survey in empirical financial
contracting research.
7In contrast, the value consequence of renegotiations triggered by bank debt covenant violations is well
documented by Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012).
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only measure covenant strictness at loan origination. I complement this line of research
by tracking the dynamic evolution of covenant strictness over time. More importantly, I
explore the underlying reasons why lenders are willing to loosen covenants during the life
of the loan.
The chapter is also related to the long-standing literature on the uniqueness of bank
loans with respect to having access to borrowers’ inside information that is otherwise
not available to other securities holders (Kane and Malkiel (1965), Fama (1985), Sharpe
(1990), Rajan (1992)), and on views that banks are better screeners that reduce ex ante in-
formation asymmetries and on their comparative monitoring advantage (Diamond, 1984,
1991a). Starting from James (1987), the extant related empirical work dominantly focuses
on equity price response to bank loan announcements (See, among others, Lummer and
McConnell (1989), Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992), Best and Zhang (1993), Billett,
Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995), and Maskara and Mullineaux (2011)). The closest work
to mine is Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1999), who find that the existence of bank debt
significantly reduces at-issue yield spreads for firms’ first public straight bond offerings.
My study extends theirs by examining banks’ post-issuance monitoring effect in the sec-
ondary bond market. By doing so, I provide evidence of a specific channel through which
banks execute the combined screening and monitoring functionality, as recently proposed
by Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009).
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.1, I develop testable hy-
potheses, focusing on the implications of renegotiated loan term changes. In Section 2.2,
I discuss my sample, variables, and summary statistics. In Section 2.3, I present the main
results and robustness tests. Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.1 Hypothesis development
In this section, I use debt contract renegotiation models developed in prior financial
contracting research to discuss testable predictions for the wealth effect of bank loan rene-
gotiation on firms’ bondholders, highlighting the implications of interest rate changes and
the relaxation of financial covenants.
2.1.1 Banks’ rent extraction and ex post renegotiation
A bank acquires privileged inside information of the borrower in the process of lend-
ing (see Fama (1985), Sharpe (1990), and Rajan (1992)), which creates the information
asymmetries between lending banks and other potential lenders and makes it costly for the
borrower to switch lenders. This information monopoly of the lending bank allows it to
extract rents from borrowers. The rents could come from directly charging a higher loan
interest rate (Schenone (2010)). It could also come from nonlending channels, including
a share of project profits (Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997)), or security un-
derwriting and M&A advisory fees (Puri (1996), Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, and Saunders
(2004), Drucker and Puri (2005), Yasuda (2005)). Moreover, if banks have equity stake in
the borrowers through, e.g., affiliated institutional investors, they can also extract rents by
exploiting the inside information in the equity market (Dass and Massa (2011)).
The theories also suggest that rent extractions depends on the relative bargaining power
of banks vs. borrowers. When borrowers wish to “go outside the deal”, which is the typical
motivation for renegotiations that I study (Roberts and Sufi (2009b)), banks would consent
to a renegotiation that makes the terms of loan contract more favorable to borrowers, such
as a reduced loan interest rate, or loosened covenants. In return, they retain the lending
relationship and thereby keep some remaining rents.
Banks’ willingness to concede is certainly higher the weaker their bargaining power
becomes. However, these actions are costly. Lowering the loan interest rate reduces banks’
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revenue, and covenant relaxations reduce monitoring intensity, which increase borrowers’
default risk and lower creditors’ recovery rates (Smith and Warner (1979), Rajan and Win-
ton (1995), Zhang (2009), Demiroglu and James (2010)). Therefore, the bank would be
willing to accept such an increased default risk via loosening of covenants as long as the
associated rents from lending relationship still outweigh the costs. As empirical evidence
already shows that banks are willing to offer below-market rates in order to capture merger
advisory business (e.g., Allen and Peristiani (2007)), it is not implausible that banks might
be willing to loosen covenants and to accept increased credit risk in the exchange of a lu-
crative business relationship with a borrower. Bondholders, however, do not benefit from
the bank’s rents, so a loosening of covenants would hurt bondholders. I can thus state my
first formal hypothesis about covenant loosening:
Hypothesis 1a: Bank loan renegotiations that loosen bank covenants result in negative
abnormal bond returns, particularly in situations where bank bargaining power is low.
2.1.2 Asymmetric information and ex post renegotiation
Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009) analyze an optimal contracting mechanism in a setting
where managers have an information advantage over lenders about the potential for future
wealth transfers, and the lenders can learn this information over time. The equilibrium
solution is a combination of strict ex ante covenants that are often relaxed as lenders ex
post favorably update their priors about a firm’s credit quality. That is, uninformed lenders
protect their interest from future transfer by obtaining strong ex ant decision rights when
initiating the loan. Subsequently upon acquiring information on the quality of the firms,
lenders will in turn give up these excessive rights back to managers whose firms are re-
vealed to pose little threat of wealth transfer. It is worth pointing out that the unconditional
effect of renegotiation on bond price might be trivial and even negative under this theory.
Only the loosening of covenants and the transfer of some control rights back to managers
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is good news to bondholders.
The Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009)’s renegotiation model thus implies the following
testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: Bank loan renegotiations that relax covenants should be associated
with positive abnormal bond returns, ceteris paribus.
2.1.3 Two-sided moral hazard and ex post renegotiation
Gorton and Kahn (2000)’s model has empirical implications for how bank loan interest
rate changes can impact bondholders’ wealth. The model assumes that the firm can engage
in asset substitution, and the bank can threaten to liquidate the firm’s project during rene-
gotiation as in Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992). If the bank receives favorable information
about project quality, there is no renegotiation. With moderately unfavorable information,
renegotiation takes place, and the bank lowers the interest rate so as to reduce the firm’s
likelihood of engaging in asset substitution. With the most unfavorable news, the bank’s
threat to liquidate is credible and the firm will allow the bank to extract a higher interest
rate in exchange for asset substitution.
Consequently, a renegotiated higher interest rate is unambiguously bad news for bond-
holders. This is because it represents that, not only has the bank received a truly negative
signal about the firm, but costly asset substitution is also allowed to occur. Moreover,
raising the rate reduces the cash and other assets available to cover principal and interest
payments on the firm’s outstanding bonds. Thus, I state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Bank loan renegotiations that raise interest rate should be associated
with negative abnormal bond return, ceteris paribus.
A renegotiated lower interest rate could be bad news for bondholders as it conveys a
bad signal about the firm’s credit quality. On the other hand, if the signal was already
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observable (though nonverifiable) to bondholders as suggested by moral hazard model,
a reduced interest rate is good news for bondholders, as it means that the firm is less
likely to engage in asset substitution. A reduced loan interest rate also means that there
is more cash left over to meet obligations on the firm’s outstanding bonds. In summary,
the theory provides no clear prediction for how bond prices should change in response to
a renegotiation that lowers the loan interest rate.
2.2 Sample construction, variables, and descriptive statistics
2.2.1 Sample construction
My research strategy is to use standard event study methods to assess bond investors’
immediate reaction to loan renegotiation announcements. Following Bessembinder, Kahle,
Maxwell, and Xu (2009) and Bao and Pan (2013), I rely on the recently available Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) databset to calculate bond return. As TRACE
starts in July 2002, I focus on non-financial public firms in Standard & Poor’s Compustat
over the 2002 to 2012 period that also have qualified publicly traded bonds in Enhanced
TRACE dataset.8 Specifically, I use bond-level information from the Mergent Fixed In-
vestment Security Database (FISD) and keep bonds that have fixed- and nonzero-coupon
rate, are in the form of either non-convertible debentures or medium term notes, have non-
missing information on bond rating, issue size, and maturity date (See, e.g., Bessembinder,
Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009)). The requirement of having publicly traded bonds dra-
matically reduces my sample size, but it is necessary for my event study analysis. Next, I
keep firms that can be matched with loan deals from Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation’s
DealScan database. I further require that each deal has information on the loan amount, the
8The TRACE Enhanced provides several improvements for research purpose over TRACE Standard
Market data: (1) it includes transactions that were reported to TRACE, but were not subject to public dis-
semination; (2) it reports transaction volumes for all transactions, instead of putting caps on larger ones; (3)
it reports historical buy-sell side information; (4) it reports transaction date and time. However, its avail-
ability is delayed by 18 months. See Dick-Nielsen (2009, 2013) for introduction to the TRACE dataset and
guidance for cleaning the TRACE Enhanced.
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interest spread, and the maturity of all tranches in the deal. For loan deals initiated before
the year 2006, I keep the ones that have matched private credit agreements collected by
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) from SEC 10-Q, 10-K, and 8-K filings.9 For the loan deals
issued since 2006, I employ Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009)’s text-search algorithm and keep
the ones for which I can identify associated private credit agreements from SEC filings.
For each contract in this set of loans, I examine the 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K filings of
the borrowing firm from the loan origination to the earlier of the maturity of the loan or
the end of the year 2012 to identify, if any, its first renegotiation that happened in and
after July, 2002.10 I drop renegotiations whose SEC filings contain confounding events
that can also affect bond returns.11 These steps result in an initial sample of 599 rene-
gotiations. The bond event study procedure introduced below in Section 2.2.2.2 and the
requirement of having nonmissing firm-level control variables from Compustat quarterly
make my benchmark sample consist of 321 loan renegotiations and 807 public bonds for
243 unique firms (Table A.1).
For the 321 loan renegotiations, I collect information for each original loan con-
tract from DealScan database, including amount, maturity, interest spread over LIBOR,
the number of tranches, and the number of lenders. As Dealscan has missing value on
covenants for a subset of loans (Drucker and Puri (2009)), I hand-collect financial covenant
information from original loan contracts provided in SEC filings. Given the facts that
covenant thresholds are often dynamically changing through time (Wittenberg Moerman,
Vasvari, and Li (2012)) and that Dealscan does not provide detailed information on this
aspect, I collect from the original loan contracts the covenant thresholds applicable to the
9I thank Amir Sufi for generously making this dataset available online
(http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.html). I refer readers to Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009)
for more details on these contracts and their text-search algorithm.
10SEC requires public firms to file material contracts and all their amendments.
11Confounding events in the same filing include: other loans or other loans’ amendments, covenant vi-
olations, M&As, asset sales/purchases, new bond issuances, share repurchases, DIP financing, default, and
bankruptcy.
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period when the renegotiation takes place. Lastly, I identify changes via renegotiation (if
any) to the loan amount, the interest spread, the maturity, and the financial covenants from
either Dealscan or the renegotiation documents in SEC filings.12
2.2.2 Key variables
2.2.2.1 Contractual term changes
I follow Roberts and Sufi (2009b) and measure amount, spread, and maturity at the
deal level, with maturity and spread averaged across all tranches within a deal, weighted
by the amount of each tranche. I then calculate the percentage change for each of the three
terms via renegotiation and denote them by ∆Amount, ∆Spread, and ∆Maturity.
In order to measure the change of covenant strictness (∆Covenant strictness), I first
follow Murfin (2012) and compute an aggregate measure of covenant strictness per deal
that incorporates not only the number of covenants, but also the slack allowed for each
covenant and the covariance of the changes in covenant variables.13 This measure gauges
covenant strictness as the ex ante probability of creditor control upon covenant violation.
Therefore, the change of covenant strictness is defined as the probability of violating
covenant after renegotiation minus the probability of violating covenant before renego-
tiation. The other commonly used measures of covenant strictness in the literature – the
number of covenants (Bradley and Roberts (2004) for bank loans and Billett, King, and
Mauer (2007) for public debt), and slacks of only a subset of covenants (Drucker and Puri
(2009) and Demiroglu and James (2010)) – are unable to fulfil the purpose here. The for-
mer fails to capture the change of covenant strictness if there are either changes to existing
covenant thresholds or to the types of covenants included in the deal, but the total number
12Dealscan’s amendment file contains useful information on renegotiation outcomes. The other reason
why Dealscan can be used for extracting renegotiation information is due to the fact that renegotiated loan
contracts are often recorded by Dealscan as an independent new observation (Roberts (2015) and Denis and
Wang (2014)).
13I thank Justin Murfin for sharing a program to calculate loan contract strictness.
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of covenants remains the same throughout the renegotiation. The latter is also problematic
because it fails to incorporate the effect of the rest covenants that are modified. To be self-
contained, the calculation of Murfin (2012)’s measure is described in detail in Appendix
C.
2.2.2.2 Abnormal bond returns
I compute short-run abnormal bond returns for all 321 renegotiations in my sample,
using an event window [-5,5] around the event date, which is defined as the earlier of
the date of the SEC filing that reports the renegotiation information, or the press release
date. I closely follow the event study procedure in Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu
(2009) and start with the construction of daily bond prices using the “trade-weighted price,
all trades” approach of Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009). This approach uti-
lizes all trades on a given day and calculates the daily price as the trade-weighted average
price.14 Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) have shown that statistical tests
based on daily abnormal returns estimated with this approach are better specified and more
powerful than those on returns computed with end-of-day prices. This is because this ap-
proach puts more weight on the large institutional trades that have lower execution costs
and thus more accurately represents the true bond price.15 A potential disadvantage is that
the daily price will reflect prices throughout the day and not necessarily at market close.
However, this problem is mitigated by examining the change of bond price from the last
day before to the first day after Day 0 within a tight event window.
To control for the well-known illiquidity of bond market, but at the same time to pre-
serve my sample size, I require that a bond trades on at least three days over the [-20,-1]
14Alternatively, Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) find that their “trade-weighted price,
trade≥100k” method, which employs trade-weighted prices using only trades of $100,000 or more, is even
more powerful than the “trade-weighted price, all trades” method. However, it leads to fewer observations
due to the elimination of days with only trades of less than $100,000.
15Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2012) show that corporate bond transaction costs are much lower for
institutional-sized transactions than for a small retail trade.
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period prior to Day 0 to be included in the sample. I am aware that this is less than the
ten-day requirement used in Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009). I will exam-
ine this issue in Section 2.3.5. Furthermore, I require that a bond trades for at least one
day within the five-day (inclusive) window on both sides of Day 0 to ensure that event
period returns reflect observable movements of prevailing market prices. However, this
may induce a potential sample selection bias if the likelihood of trading is positively asso-
ciated with the informativeness of the renegotiation. As a result, this requirement would
bias the sample toward renegotiations that contain more new information and overestimate
the effect of loan renegotiations. I will also address this potential sample selection bias in
Section 2.3.5.
Excess bond returns are computed as the difference between a bond’s total return and
the value-weighted total return on a rating- and maturity-matched bond portfolio, where
the weights are based on the bond market value on the last trading day within five days






where, BPt+1 is the bond clean price on the first trading day within five days after Day
0, and BPt−1 is the clean price for the same bond on the last trading day within five days
prior to Day 0. AIt−1 is the accrued interest sine the last coupon payment until t−1, and
Ct−1,t+1 is the coupon payment (if any) between day t−1 and day t+1.
To construct bond portfolios based on both rating and time-to-maturity, I use the entire
TRACE database but exclude event bonds whose firms have renegotiated their bank loans
over the window [t-30,t+30]. I drop bonds unrated or with a rating below Caa, and divide
16The formula for calculating bond return in Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) (Page 4226)
uses clean price (instead of dirty price) in the denominator. My results still hold based on abnormal bond
returns calculated using their formula.
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the remaining ones into seven rating groups: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and Caa.17 For Aa,
Ba, B groups, the maturity cutoffs are 0 to 5 years and +5 years. For A and Baa groups,
the cutoffs are 0 to 6 years and +6 years. These cutoffs are chosen to ensure that there
is approximately the same number of bonds within each category. For the Aaa and Caa
groups, the sample sizes are too small to be further divided based on maturity. Such a
strategy results in a total of 12 rating- and maturity-based portfolios. When calculating
total return for each bond in the portfolios, I also require matching on the windows of the
available pricing data for each event bond. Denoting these matched portfolio returns by
MPRt , the excess return for each bond is:
ABRt=0 = BRt=0−MPRt=0. (2.2)
When a firm has multiple bonds, the firm-level bond excess return and rating are calcu-
lated as value-weighted averages across individual bonds within a firm, where the weights
are based on the market value of each bond on the last trading day within five days prior
to Day 0. The advantages of the firm-level approach are that it does not suffer from a
cross-correlation problem arising from using multiple observations per event; and it also
precisely captures the full impact of the renegotiation on the value of a firm’s bondholders.
All the abnormal bond returns are expressed in basis points (bps).
2.2.2.3 Abnormal stock returns
In addition to examining abnormal bond announcement returns, I also analyze the ef-
fect of loan renegotiation on the value of shareholders in Section 2.3.4. Abnormal stock
returns are calculated using the Carhart Four-Factor model on a daily basis. The esti-
mation period for the model coefficients is 255 trading days, ending 30 days before the
announcement date. I then calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the same
17When a bond is rated by more than one rating agency, I choose to use S&P over Moody’s over Fitch.
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event window as used in the bond event study.18
2.2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table A.2 reports the summary statistics for the sample of 321 bank loan renegotia-
tions by 243 borrowers for which I am able to compute abnormal bond return. The first
set of statistics describes the borrowers’ characteristics in the quarter prior to the renego-
tiation. Firms in my sample on average are large, with mean book assets (market capital-
ization) around $6 billion ($3.5 billion). This is consistent with the fact that firms having
access to public debt markets are typically larger (Faulkender and Petersen (2006)). Ap-
proximately two thirds of these firms are speculative-graded. An average firm owns about
2.7 bonds, which have an average remaining maturity of 7 years.
The average loan size in my sample is $1,046 million, has a stated maturity of 4.5
years, and has an average spread over LIBOR of 177 basis points. The average number
of facilities within a deal is 1.6 and on average there are 14.6 lenders participating in a
syndicated loan. To facilitate discussion, I follow Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) and group
financial covenants into the following groups: coverage ratio covenants (interest coverage,
fixed charge coverage, and debt service coverage), debt to cash flow ratio covenants (debt
to cash flow ratio, senior debt to cash flow ratio), debt to balance sheet covenants (debt to
total capitalization, debt to total net worth, debt to tangible net worth), net worth covenants
(total net worth, tangible net worth), liquidity covenants (including current ratio, quick
ratio covenants), minimum cash flow covenants, and capital expenditure restrictions. The
most frequently used covenant group is coverage ratio covenants, appearing in 72% of my
sample, followed by debt to cash flow covenants (60%) and debt to balance sheet covenants
(24%). Consistent with Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009), capital expenditure restriction is
commonly used in loan contracts, accounting for 21% of my sample.
18If a firm has multiple bonds, the starting (ending) date of the event window for calculating stock CAR
is the earliest (latest) date among the event windows for these bonds.
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Table A.3 reports renegotiation outcomes for my sample loans. Panel A shows that
among all the 321 loan renegotiations, 67% of the sample loans have modified at least one
of the following items in their first renegotiation: amount, maturity, spread, or financial
covenants. Amount, maturity, and spread are equally likely to be modified, accounting
for about 41% of the sample. Among financial covenants, debt to cash flow covenants
is most likely to be modified, accounting for 15.6% of the sample, followed by coverage
ratio covenants (9.4%), net worth covenants (5.0%), and capital expenditure restrictions
(5.0%). As liquidity covenants do not experience any change in the renegotiation sample,
I do not report them in the rest of Table A.3.
Panel B of Table A.3 reports the renegotiation outcomes conditional on whether an
item is tightened or loosened.19 Except for net worth covenants, a large majority of rene-
gotiations relax the loan constraints. This pattern is largely consistent with Denis and
Wang (2014). In particular, Murfin (2012)’s covenant strictness measure in the bottom of
the panel shows that almost 75% renegotiations reduce the probability of being controlled
by creditors via covenant violation.
Panel C of Table A.3 reports that renegotiations lead to substantial changes in existing
loan amount, maturity, spread, and financial covenants, while panel D reports that these
large changes exist for both renegotiations that tighten previous terms and renegotiations
that relax previous terms. For example, for renegotiations that relax contractual terms (i.e.
right part of panel D), on average, the absolute values of changes range from 18% to 100%.
The similar magnitude of changes is reported by Denis and Wang (2014) for covenant lim-
its, which ranges from 30% to over 80%, and by Roberts and Sufi (2009b) for changes of
the existing maturity, amount, and interest spread, which range from 40% to 64%. Such
substantial relaxation to loan terms and financial covenants lifts restrictions imposed on
19For some financial covenant categories, the total number of covenants renegotiated could be greater than
the number of corresponding loans shown in panel A of Table A.3, due to the fact that a covenant category
could contain more than one type of specific covenant.
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managers, enabling them to make significant changes in corporate investment and financ-
ing policies (Denis and Wang (2014)), which could in turn affect firms’ bondholders. This
question is examined in the following section.
2.3 Empirical results
In this section, I first report the univariate analysis of short-run abnormal bond returns.
I then discuss the regression specifications used to formally test my hypotheses and report
the results. Lastly, I report a battery of robustness tests.
2.3.1 Univariate analysis of excess bond returns
Panel A of Table A.4 compares the sample distributions among unwinsorized and
winsorized bond abnormal returns. The purpose is to provide cautions and guidance for
conducting the following univariate analysis and for the regression methods used later on.
The first row reports the distribution of unwinsorized bond abnormal returns. It has ex-
tremely large standard deviation, high skewness and kurtosis. Winsorizing at 1% and 99%
dramatically mitigates these issues and winsorizing at 5% and 95% further reduces the
dispersion and brings the kurtosis close to three, the kurtosis level of the normal distribu-
tion. Accordingly, my univariate analysis in panel B of Table A.4 is based on bond excess
returns winsorized at 5% and 95%.
Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) show that nonparametric testsfor ex-
ample, the Wilcoxon signed rank test and the sign testhave more power than the paramet-
ric t-test; and they suggest that both parametric and nonparametric test statistics should be
examined. Therefore, I present both parametric and nonparametric tests when assessing
the significance levels of abnormal bond returns. Specifically, the significance level of the
mean and the significance level of the difference in means are based on t-test, and I assume
unequal variance across groups when assessing the mean difference between subsamples.
The significance of the median is based on two tests: a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and a
19
sign test. The significance level of the difference in medians is based on both a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test and a nonparametric equality-of-medians test.
Based on the first row of panel B of Table A.4, bank loan renegotiations in my sample
experience insignificant abnormal bond return of -2.22 bps at mean and -0.6 bps at median,
based on t-test, nonparametric signed-rank test or sign test. The remaining rows of panel B
of Table A.4 compare bond abnormal returns based on a variety of grouping criteria. I first
report the returns for investment-grade firms versus speculative-grade firms. The sign test
shows that while bondholders of investment-grade firms experience significant abnormal
return (16.15 bps), there is a marginally significant and negative response from bondhold-
ers of speculative-grade firms to bank loan renegotiations, with a magnitude of -5.50 bps
at median. The difference in bondholders’ median returns between investment-grade and
speculative-grade firms is statistically significant based on both the Wilcoxon rank-sum
test and the nonparametric equality-of-medians test; the difference of mean returns is also
significant based on the t-test.
The rest of the groupings are based on whether the four contractual terms–covenant,
spread, maturity, and amount–are renegotiated. The abnormal bond return when renegotia-
tion loosens covenant strictness is insignificantly positive, while the abnormal bond return
when covenants are tightened is larger in magnitude and is significantly negative based on
the sign test. The differences in mean and median are both economically and statistically
significant different from zero.
Second, loan spread increase triggers negative but insignificant abnormal bond returns
at both the mean (-21.44 bps) and median (-15.59 bps), while loan spread decrease does not
have a strong impact on bondholders. The difference of mean abnormal returns between
the two subgroups is marginally significant at 12%. This seems to be consistent with the
prediction of Gorton and Kahn (2000) that bank loan renegotiations that raise interest rate
should be associated with more negative news of the firm. Lastly, while clear empirical
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predictions on how the change of maturity and amount affect bond prices are lacking, I
examine the returns of the two groups and, and no interesting pattern is found.
While the univariate analysis is informative, it is possible that they are driven by cor-
relations among contractual term changes, and by firm’s characteristics (such as credit
risk). To segment these different effects on bond returns and provide cleaner tests on my
hypotheses, regression analysis is conducted in the following sections.
2.3.2 Regression analysis of abnormal bond returns
This section tests the hypotheses developed in Section 2.1. To deal with outliers, the
existing finance literature has used median, robust, and ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression.20 I perform all three types, which generally yield qualitatively similar results.
In particular, I run a simultaneous-quantile regression with estimates at 25%, 50%, and
75% quantiles and obtain standard errors by performing 1000 bootstrap replications. For
the median and robust regressions, I use unwinsorized abnormal returns, while for OLS, I
use abnormal returns winsorized at 5% and 95% as these returns have better distribution
properties discussed above; and cluster standard errors by firm.
I estimate the following model for abnormal bond returns:
ABRt = α+β1∆Covenant strictnesst +β2∆Spreadt +β3∆Maturityt (2.3)
+ β4∆Amountt +ΓFirm controlst−1+ΞMacro controlst
+ Y +FF12+ εt ,
20Median regression minimizes the sum of absolute deviations rather than the sum of squared deviations
as in OLS. More introduction of median regression is in Koenker and Bassett (1982). Robust regression
conducts an initial screening based on regression results and eliminates gross outliers, and it uses the re-
maining observations and an iterative method that minimizes a weighted sum of squared errors to perform
regression. For more technique details on robust regression, see Li (1985) and Street, Carroll, and Ruppert
(1988). In Stata 12, rreg implements it. These two estimation techniques are used by, for example, Hall
and Liebman (1998), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Jin (2002), Drechsler and Yaron (2011), and Li and
Srinivasan (2011).
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where the dependent variable is abnormal bond return introduced in Section 2.2.2.2. The
key independent variables are ∆Covenant strictness, ∆Spread, ∆Maturity, and ∆Amount,
capturing separately the effect of the change of covenant strictness, spread, maturity and
amount via loan renegotiation. To facilitate interpretation, I multiply ∆Covenant strictness
by negative one so that now the positive value of this variable represents the reduction of
the ex ante probability of lender control, which in turn makes positive value of estimated
β1 directly capture the effect of loosening covenant strictness. Furthermore, to make it
easier to assess relative importance of each variable, I standardize the four contract change
variables conditional on being modified. This takes into account the fact that not all rene-
gotiations in my sample experience change on either covenant, spread, amount, or maturity
(as shown in panel A of Table A.3), which would have biased bondholder wealth effect
of renegotiations downward had I standardized them across the whole sample. However, I
standardize all continuous control variables unconditionally, which are introduced next.
I control for firm characteristics, all of which are one quarter lagged relative to the
renegotiation to avoid any mechanical associations (Roberts and Sufi (2009b)). Specif-
ically, I use a speculative-grade dummy and natural logarithm of book assets as proxies
for credit quality. The dummy captures the overall credit risk of the firm and book assets
capture the firm’s ability to secure or collateralize its debt, as well as proxy for the liq-
uidation value in distress. I also control for market-to-book ratio, which measures future
investment opportunities of the firm.
I use a set of macroeconomic factors to represent borrowers outside options (Roberts
and Sufi (2009b)). I use quarterly GDP growth to measure aggregate productivity. I use
bank leverage, an aggregate-level proxy for the financial health of the banking industry,
which is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total book assets for commercial banks
in the United States based on data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
I use the quarterly CRSP value-weighted index return as a measure of the attractiveness
22
of equity financing. In addition, I use an aggregate-level proxy that measures the degree
of competition that a bank faces in a quarter from other banks or nonbank lenders. This
variable is constructed from Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on bank lending prac-
tices, i.e. on reasons for easing lending standard or loan terms (Liu (2013)).21 All nominal
variables are deflated to 1996 by the All-Urban Consumer Price Index (CPI). Appendix B
provides detailed definition and data sources for these variables.
I also include year and Fama and French 12-industry fixed effects. The former controls
for any contemporaneous effect of macroeconomic fluctuations, while the latter takes into
account the possibility that renegotiation may be triggered by industry-wide shock. The
industry fixed effect also helps capture the industry-segmented institutional structure of
syndicated lending that may affect the outcome of loan renegotiations (Roberts and Sufi
(2009b)).
Panel A of Table A.5 reports the results. First and foremost, the coefficient estimate
for the change of covenant strictness (∆Covenant strictness) is consistently positive and
statistically significant across all the three estimation techniques. This evidence provides
strong support for Hypothesis 1b over Hypothesis 1a, as it implies that loosening covenants
are welcomed by bondholders, who are expecting that improved credit quality of the firm
would enhance the bond value. The effect is economically significant, too. It implies that
holding everything else constant, one standard deviation decrease in the ex ant probability
of lender control via covenant violation on average increases bond return by almost 34
bps, according to the most conservative estimate from OLS. Next, the coefficient estimate
for ∆Spread is primarily negative across the three estimation techniques, and is statisti-
cally significant at 5% in robust regression. However, the overall effect of renegotiated
spread–the sum of the estimated intercept and coefficient on ∆Spread–is not statistically
21I thank Yan Liu for generously sharing this hand-collected data. See Liu (2013) for more detailed de-
scription on this data. I use an aggregate measure since individual bank-level survey results are not publicly
available.
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different from zero, according to untabulated Wald tests. The coefficient estimates for both
∆Maturity and ∆Amount are small in magnitude and are statistically insignificant. Consis-
tent with univariate analysis, the speculative-grade dummy has a significant and negative
coefficient estimate, implying that bondholders’ response at risky firms is not as positive
as their counterparts at firms with high credit quality. Lastly, there is little evidence that the
macroeconomic factors, which represent borrowers outside options, have any significant
effect on bondholders’ wealth.
It is possible that the bondholder wealth effect of renegotiated loan term changes differs
between investment-grade firms and speculative-grade firms, since the two sets of firms
are fundamentally different. I examine this possibility by interacting the speculative-grade
dummy with each of the loan term change variables. Unreported results find insignificant
coefficient estimates on these interactive terms, implying that there is no obvious hetero-
geneous effect of loan contractual term changes via renegotiation across the two groups of
firms.
2.3.3 Individual-level bargaining power proxies
Aggregate-level macro measures for borrowers’ outside options overlook the hetero-
geneity of bargaining power across individual observations, potentially resulting in low
power for my former statistical tests. To alleviate the concern, I follow Murfin (2012) and
employ three individual-level proxies for the relative bargaining power of banks v.s bor-
rowers: lender capitalization, the number of lender relationships, and a commercial paper
issuer dummy.
Lender capitalization is the ratio of shareholder equity to total assets held by the
lead arranger(s) in the last quarter prior to renegotiation.22 The rational is that healthy
22I measure it at ultimate parent firm level and take care of bank mergers and acquisitions. The DealScan
lender names is hand-matched to Compustat, and quarterly data are extracted from either Banks, North
America, and Global. I use the average if there is more than one lead arranger.
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banks with high capitalization are willing to grant loans with looser covenants (Murfin
(2012)), suggesting that well-capitalized banks have more flexibility than otherwise poor-
capitalized banks in retaining the lending relationship with firm by relaxing covenants.23
The number of lender relationships is the number of banks used over the last four trans-
actions prior to the renegotiation, scaled by the number of prior transactions used in the
calculation as some firms have less than four prior transactions. It captures the breadth of
a borrower’s outside bank choices and the extent of hold-up problems caused by exclusive
bank-borrower relationships. Lastly, commercial paper market is viewed as a close sub-
stitute for bank borrowings (Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993)) and I therefore set the
commercial paper issuer dummy to be one if the short-term ratings is at least A-2, and
zero otherwise.24
Panel B of Table A.5 reports robust regression results on a specification that extends
the one in panel A by adding the three bargaining power proxies one at a time and their
interaction with the renegotiated change of covenant strictness. The results are similar
when using OLS and median regressions. According to Hypothesis 1a, the negative impact
of relaxing covenants on bondholders, if any, is expected to be stronger when borrowers
have relative stronger bargaining power. In fact, the coefficient sign for the interaction
terms with lender capitalization and with the number of lender relationships is negative,
but it is only significant when the number of lender relationship proxy is used. Moreover,
unreported Wald tests show that the magnitude of these coefficients is so small that the
net effect of covenant relaxation is still positive and significant for firms that have more
outside bank choices or whose lenders are well-capitalized. In addition, the coefficient
23Alternatively, according to Murfin (2012), “limited liability for bank shareholders may induce gambling
when the bank is undercapitalized.” Banks may loosen covenant strictness with larger losses in bad states
in exchange for higher interest rates or lucrative business (e.g. underwriter or M&A advisor fee) in good
state of the world. The relation between lender capitalization and renegotiated covenant strictness change is
eventually an empirical question.
24Due to the availability of these measures, the sample size is reduced. In unreported analysis, I confirm
that the main results in panel A of A.1 holds for these smaller samples.
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estimates for all the three proxies are not significant at all. The coefficient estimate for
∆Spread is significantly negative across all the three specifications, but untabulated Wald
test shows that the overall effect of renegotiated spread, i.e. the sum of the estimated
intercept and coefficient on ∆Spread, is not statistically different from zero. Overall, there
is little evidence supporting either Hypothesis 1a that bank loan renegotiations that loosen
bank covenants is associated with negative abnormal bond returns; or Hypothesis 2 that
bank loan renegotiations that increase loan spread is associated with negative bondholders’
reaction.
2.3.4 Further investigation of Hypothesis 2
I conduct two tests in this section to investigate why I fail to find on average a sizable
and significant negative bondholders’ reaction to bank loan renegotiations that raise inter-
est rate spread as predicted by Hypothesis 2. According to Gorton and Kahn (2000), when
the most unfavorable news arrives, because the banks threat to liquidate is credible, firms
will allow the bank to extract a higher interest rate in exchange for asset substitution. This
would imply a positive shareholder reaction to renegotiations that increase spread if the
asset substitution effect outweighs the effect of bad news. Therefore, in place of abnormal
bond return. Panel A of Table A.6 examines stock cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in
the same specification (2.3).25
The coefficient for ∆Spread is positive and statistically significant for five out of six
estimates; and the magnitude is also economically large. Based on the OLS estimate, one
standard deviation increase of loan spread is associated with 1.6% cumulative abnormal
stock return over a [-5,5] window. This seems to be consistent with the asset substitution
story. In addition, there is some evidence that loosening covenants via renegotiation is
25Two renegotiations are dropped as there is no sufficient stock return data for the event study. In unre-
ported analysis, the main findings for abnormal bond returns in Section 2.3.2 still holds for the remaining
319 observations.
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associated with positive stock reaction, which is significant for OLS and robust regression,
while is insignificant at traditional levels for simultaneous-quantile regressions.
There may be, however, an alternative explanation to the positive shareholder reaction
to renegotiations that increase loan spread. That is, as the firm’s equity can be viewed
as a call option on the firm’s total assets (Merton (1974)), that firms delay a default by
compensating their lenders for additional loan risk exposure is equivalent to extending
the expiration date of that call option, which effectively increases the value of the option.
To differentiate the two possible explanations, I next compare the relation between firms’
quarterly investment and stock volatility within the four quarters after renegotiation con-
ditional on the change of loan spread. Eisdorfer (2008) has shown both theoretically and
empirically that the risk-shifting incentive can weaken and even reverse the expected neg-
ative relation between stock volatility and investment. Consequently, I am expecting that,
if Gorton and Kahn (2000)’s model holds, the post-renegotiation relation between invest-
ment and volatility is less negative (or even positive) for the subset of renegotiations that
increase spread than for the subset of renegotiations that do not change spread. However,
extending a call option’s expiration date does not generate the same implication.
Motivated by Johnson (2003), I use a specification that allows the coefficient on stock
volatility to change across subsamples based on whether and how spread changes. I do
this by defining three zero-one dummy variables indicating whether spread is increased,
unchanged, or decreased, and then time each dummy by stock volatility. That is,
It = α0+α1stock volatilityt−1,∆spread>0 (2.4)
+ α2stock volatilityt−1,∆spread=0
+ α3stock volatilityt−1,∆spread<0
+ β1∆Covenant strictnesst +β2∆Spreadt
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+ β3∆Maturityt +β4∆Amountt +ΓFirm controlst−1
+ FF12+Qtr+ εt ,
where the dependent variable is either the sum of the capital expenditure and R&D ex-
pense (Total investment), capital expenditure (Capex), or R&D. Note that α1, α2, and α3
directly measure the relation between investment and stock volatility for each of the three
subsets of renegotiations. I add the four continuous loan term change measures and include
logged book assets, market-to-book ratio, book leverage, cash flow, and cash holding in
Firm controls, all of which are defined in Appendix B. I also control for Fama-French 12
industry and calendar quarter fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by firm and calendar
quarter (Petersen (2009)).
Panel B of Table A.6 reports the results. First, note that the coefficient estimates on
firm controls are consistent with the existing literature (e.g. Eisdorfer (2008)). Most im-
portantly, in contrast to what the asset substitution problem would suggest, the investment
and stock volatility relation is more negative for the subset of renegotiations that increase
loan spread than for the subset of renegotiations that do not change spread. This result is
mainly driven by the relation between capital expenditure and stock volatility, while the
result for R&D is lacking statistical significance, probably due to the fact that only 20%
of the sample reports non-zero R&D expense. Focusing on capital expenditure, the rela-
tion between investment and stock volatility for the subset of renegotiations that increase
spread is significantly negative (-0.017); and based on unreported Wald tests, it is also sig-
nificantly more negative at 5% level than the counterparts for the subset of renegotiations
that either do not change or decrease loan spread. Overall, the combined evidence suggests
that while increased loan spread reveals unfavorable information and reduces the available
resource for bondholders, the firm becomes more conservative in making investment deci-
sions. These two opposite effects explain why I fail to find any noticeable negative reaction
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The discussion of Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2 in Section 2.1 suggests that the
effect of loosening covenant strictness (increasing loan spread) is likely to be different
from the effect of tightening covenant strictness (decreasing loan spread). I seek to capture
these asymmetric effects by decomposing the change of covenant strictness into a positive
and negative component. I use the absolute value form of the two components in the
regression analysis, since it allows the coefficient of each component to directly reflect
any potential differential effect. I do the same to the change of loan spread.26
Panel A of Table A.7 reports the asymmetric effect of loosening covenants vs. tight-
ening covenants. Results based on OLS, robust regression, and quantile regressions are
consistent and show that the positive impact of covenant strictness change as documented
in Table A.5 comes exclusively from loosening covenants, though the estimates at 25%
and 75% are insignificant. The coefficient estimate for tightening covenants is small and
insignificant. This might be due to the fact that there are only 17 renegotiations in my sam-
ple that tighten covenants (see panel B of Table A.3), which reduce the power of the test.
Another possibility is that while tightening covenants benefits bondholders by increased
bank monitoring, it is usually associated with the arrival of bad information of the firm,
which hurts bondholders. As a result, the net effect could be small. In unreported Wald
tests, I find that the difference of coefficient estimates between loosening and tightening
covenants is marginally significantly different from zero in robust regression. In contrast,
26I focus on discussing the two term changes as these are the only ones where the theory says there might
be a differential effect. In unreported analysis, I examine the asymmetric effect for changes of loan amount
and maturity, and I find no effect.
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I do not find any significant asymmetric effect of increasing vs. decreasing loan spread on
bond abnormal returns as reported in panel B of Table A.7.
2.3.5.2 Bond illiquidity and sample selection issues
This section addresses two concerns related to the bond event study as mentioned in
Section 2.2.2.2. The one is that, in order to preserve the sample size, I have imposed
the requirement of three-day trades over the [-20,-1] period prior to Day 0, which is less
stringent than the ten-day trades requirement in Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu
(2009). In untabulated analyses, I rerun the analysis in Table 4 using the ten-day trades
requirement. It results in a much smaller sample of 229 renegotiations, which leads to
a qualitative similar but less significant relation between abnormal bond returns and the
change of covenant strictness.
The other issue is about a potential selection bias due to the requirement that bond
price should be available on both sides of Day 0 within five-day event window. Following
May (2010), I deal with this concern by examining the sample of bonds without imposing
this requirement, as long as they meet the three-day liquidity requirement. This method
assumes that, for a day where a bond does not trade, the bond’s price did not change
and the raw return only reflects accrued interest. This method produces a sample of 378
renegotiations, and in untabulated results, I repeat the analysis in Table A.5 using this
sample and the results are similar to those reported in Table A.5.
2.3.5.3 Alternative explanations
The positive bondholders’ reaction to renegotiations that relax covenants could be due
to the fact that the increased risk taking upon covenant violation has been avoided upon
loosening covenants. While Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012)’s evidence seems to support the
view that corporate governance via creditor control upon covenant violation increases the
firm value, the literature also finds that risk-shifting activities increase after covenant vio-
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lation. Specifically, Esmer (2010) finds that there is a positive relation between volatility
and investment upon technical default, and the relation is much stronger for firms whose
CEO has stronger risk-taking incentive (i.e. high compensation portfolio sensitivity to
stock return volatility and high equity ownership). Esmer (2010) further finds a significant
increase in firm risk in the year following the violation. Therefore, the positive coeffi-
cient on relaxing covenants might just be driven by the fact that relaxing covenants avoids
covenant violation and subsequent risk shifting, which improve bondholders’ wealth. To
rule out this possibility, I exclude renegotiations that are followed by covenant violation
in the upcoming year. These renegotiations are more likely to represents the set of firms
which would have violated covenants in the absence of renegotiation. It reduces the sam-
ple size to 309. The results, as reported in panel A of Table A.8, are very similar to panel
A of Table A.5.
Finally, I examine the possibility that the results might be driven by information re-
leased from earnings announcements. Easton, Monahan, and Vasvari (2009) find that bond
price reacts significantly around earnings announcements. Therefore, I follow Klein and
Zur (2011) and control for this type of event by including a dummy variable that is set to
one if the firm had an earnings announcement in the event window and zero otherwise. For
my renegotiation sample, there are 62 renegotiations which have earnings announcements
within the [-5, 5] window. In panel B of Table A.8, I find that the earnings announce-
ment dummy has insignificant coefficient, while the estimates for the rest variables are
still similar to Table A.5.
2.4 Conclusion
In this study, I empirically examine why debt renegotiations happen in the context
of bank loan renegotiations outside any sort of financial distress or default. I find a
statistically and economically significant bondholder reaction to renegotiations that re-
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lax covenant strictness. This result supports the Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009) model,
where banks are willing to transfer substantial control rights back to firms when firms
have less opportunities of wealth transferring from bondholders to stockholders. At the
same time, this result reject the possibility that renegotiations when firms have strong bar-
gaining power could hurt bondholders. I find little evidence that renegotiated increase
of bank loan interest rate leads to negative bondholders’ reaction as implied by Gorton
and Kahn (2000). This is explained by the evidence that firms become more conservative
in making investment decisions after such renegotiations, although increased loan spread
usually indicates the deterioration of firms credit quality.
This study also provides guidance for future research. I provide strong support for the
economic mechanism proposed in Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009). That is, loosening strict
covenant over time is a way that “good-type” firms use to mitigate financing frictions from
asymmetric information between creditors and firms. However, it is still unclear what the
nature of the friction is. In other words, is it due to asset substitution, debt overhang,
or inefficient liquidation? For example, in Myers (1977), that renegotiation breakdowns
generate debt overhang is central to his original analysis (see also Hart and Moore (1995),
Bhattacharya and Faure-Grimaud (2001), and Tirole (2010)). Hence, it would be interest-
ing to examine whether bank loan renegotiation helps mitigate underinvestment problems,
and if so, to what extent.
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3. CEO INSIDE DEBT AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT ISSUES
A large and rich literature focuses on the nature of conflicts between a firm’s stockhold-
ers and its debtholders. If not resolved efficiently, these conflicts can distort investment and
financing decisions and reduce firm value. Shortening debt maturity is prominent among
the ways that firms can attempt to reduce the severity and costs of stockholder-debtholder
conflicts. For example, Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) and Leland and Toft (1996)
show that short debt maturity can mitigate managerial incentives to engage in risk shift-
ing. Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) find empirical evidence that firms choose shorter
debt maturity when their CEOs have greater risk taking incentives. Rajan and Winton
(1995) and Stulz (2000) emphasize that short-term debt can force managers to face reg-
ular monitoring by outsider creditors. Myers (1977) shows theoretically that shortening
debt maturity can alleviate underinvestment problems; Johnson (2003) provides empirical
support for the hypothesis.
Shortening debt maturity is not, however, without costs. Diamond (1991b, 1993) and
Sharpe (1991) emphasize the liquidity and roll-over risks of short-term debt, and Johnson
(2003) finds that the increased risk of shorter debt maturity negatively affects leverage.
Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012) finds that firms who have large
portion of debt maturing right after the 2007 financial crisis dramatically reduce their
investment than similar firms who otherwise have debt maturing after 2008. Liquidity
risk stems from the possibility that firms experience negative shocks around the times they
need to refinance, and also from the possibility of negative shocks that affect lenders such
as the recent financial crisis. Thus, firms face a tradeoff of greater risk when they attempt
to reduce the severity and costs of shareholder-debtholder conflicts by shortening debt
maturity.
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A growing set of recent studies focus on the role of CEO inside debt in mitigating
stockholder-debtholder conflicts. CEO inside debt includes defined-benefit pensions and
deferred compensation arrangements, and thus resembles other debt that firms owe. The
basic idea originated with Jensen and Meckling (1976). Edmans and Liu (2011) develops
the idea more formally, and demonstrates theoretically that inside debt can reduce asset
substitution problems (and similar stockholder-debtholder conflicts). Empirical studies
find inside debt to be an important and prevalent feature of modern executive compensation
in the United States (Bebchuk and Jackson (2005), Sundaram and Yermack (2007), and
Wei and Yermack (2011)). There is also evidence that CEO inside debt is related to more
conservative corporate investment and financing decisions (e.g. Sundaram and Yermack
(2007), Wei and Yermack (2011), Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012), Liu, Mauer,
and Zhang (2014), Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2012)). The evidence is consistent with the
notion that CEOs compensated (at least in part) with debt-like instruments have some
degree of incentive alignment with debtholders.
We join the literature on how debt maturity can reduce stockholder-debtholder conflicts
with the literature on how CEO inside debt can reduce those conflicts to hypothesize that
firms with greater levels of CEO inside debt can employ longer maturity corporate debt
structures. If a firm can reduce the severity of stockholder-debtholder conflicts via the use
of inside debt compensation to its CEO, it can avoid having to shorten debt maturity and
the associated risks and costs of doing so. The basic hypothesis is straightforward, but
it requires refinement to generate testable hypotheses. The incentive alignment effect of
CEO inside debt relies critically on the extent to which the payoffs to debt compensation
resemble payoffs to risky corporate debt (i.e. unsecured debt) (Edmans and Liu (2011),
Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013)). If CEOs can withdraw their debt compensation
before other corporate debt matures, i.e., if it has a shorter maturity than the maturity of
the other corporate debt, it eliminates the risk that these CEOs will lose benefits if their
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firms go bankrupt after withdrawal. Consequently, inside debt with maturity shorter than
that of corporate debt is effectively senior to that corporate debt if bankruptcy occurs in
the short term, which renders the incentive-alignment effect of inside debt weak or even
negligible for creditors whose claims mature after inside debt. Thus, we must differentiate
between firms with short maturity inside debt and those with long maturity inside debt.
The second critical dimension for the incentive alignment effect of CEO inside debt
relies on its magnitude relative to the CEOs equity holdings and the firm’s overall leverage
ratio. A CEO should be debt biased if she has a leverage ratio (her inside debt / her equity
positions in the firm) that is greater than the firms debt to equity ratio (Edmans and Liu
(2011)); this is termed a relative CEO leverage ratio greater than 1.0. Conversely, a CEO
with a relative leverage ratio below 1.0 should be equity biased in her decision-making.
We test three specific hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that among firms with long-
term inside debt, debt maturity for firms with debt-biased CEO relative leverage ratios
is greater than for firms with equity-biased CEO relative leverage ratios; this hypothesis
captures the debt vs. equity bias dimension of inside debt among firms for which inside
debt maturity is long enough to matter. Second, we hypothesize that among firms with
debt-biased CEO relative leverage ratios, debt maturity for firms with long-term inside
debt is greater than for firms with short-term inside debt; this hypothesis captures the
importance of the inside debt maturity dimension among the set of firms whose CEOs
should have a debt bias. Third, we hypothesize that among firms with equity-biased CEO
relative leverage ratios, debt maturity for firms with long-term inside debt is less than
for firms with short-term inside debt; this hypothesis captures the point that stockholder-
debtholder conflicts should be greater for firms with long-term inside debt levels that are
equity biased.
Using a sample of 4,399 new debt issues by firms between 2007 and 2012, we find
support for all three hypotheses. Among firms with long-term inside debt, firms whose
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CEOs have debt-biased inside debt levels issue debt with a maturity of approximately one
year longer than firms with equity-biased debt. Given a sample median maturity of 5 years,
the effect of debt bias is an approximately 20% increase in the maturity. Among firms
with debt-biased levels of inside debt, firms whose CEOs have long-term inside debt issue
corporate debt with more than a half year longer maturity than do firms whose CEOs have
short-term inside debt. Finally, among firms with equity-biased levels of inside debt, we
find significantly one-year shorter maturity of new issues for firms with long-term inside
debt compared to those with short-term inside debt. The results provide support for the
overall hypothesis that CEO inside debt affects firms debt maturity structure through its
ability to ameliorate stockholder-debtholder conflicts.
We next turn to additional tests to examine whether the relation between corporate
debt maturity and CEO inside debt is stronger among firms for which the amelioration of
stockholder-debtholder conflicts is expected to be large. Specifically, we sort the sample
on firms’ market-to-book ratios, and re-estimate the regressions for high and low market-
to-book firms relative to the sample median. Risk shifting should be easier when choosing
among new investments than assets already in place, so the effect between CEO inside
debt and corporate debt maturity should be stronger for high market-to-book firms. More-
over, high market-to-book firms should have greater underinvestment problems, which
also predicts a stronger effect for these firms between CEO inside debt and corporate debt
maturity. Consistent with the view that stockholder-debtholder conflicts drive the three
relations we discuss above, we find that the relations hold only among firms with high
market-to-book ratios. Firms with low market-to-book ratios are expected to have less
severe stockholder-debtholder conflicts, which is consistent with our finding of no reliable
relation between CEO inside debt and corporate debt maturity for these firms.
We also employ a bias-corrected nearest neighbor matching approach, and obtain
matched firm, difference-in-difference estimates for firms that either change their incen-
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tive bias while holding incentive horizon type the same, or change their incentive horizon
type while holding incentive bias unchanged. This approach control for observed and un-
observed firm heterogeneity. We find statistically and economically strong evidence for
our first hypothesis that among firms with long-term inside debt, debt maturity for firms
with debt-biased CEO relative leverage ratios is greater than for firms with equity-based
CEO relative leverage ratios.
This chapter makes several contributions. First, Our paper contributes to the burgeon-
ing research on the economic consequences of managerial debt compensation.1 Sundaram
and Yermack (2007) find that Merton’s (1974) distance to default is greater when the
CEO’s pension value increases relative to his equity value. In a follow up, Wei and Yer-
mack (2011) examine security holders’ reactions when firms were first required to report
CEO inside debt positions following a 2007 SEC disclosure reform. They find an increase
in bond prices, a decrease in equity prices, and a drop in overall firm value. Both stud-
ies suggest that CEOs with large inside debt positions incline to manage their firms more
conservatively. Subsequent research finds evidence that is consistent with the implication.
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that larger CEO inside debt holdings are
associated with lower firm stock return volatility, R&D expenditures, and leverage, and
with greater corporate diversification and liquidity. Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2012) find
that larger CEO inside debt is directly related to value-destroying diversifying acquisitions
that decrease overall firm volatility. Related, Phan (2013) documents a positive (nega-
tive) relation between CEO inside debt holdings and M&A announcement abnormal bond
(stock) returns. Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014) find that corporate cash balances increase
with CEO inside debt and the marginal shareholder value of these higher cash balances
decreases in CEO inside debt, especially for firms with poor governance. Chen, Dou,
1Sundaram and Yermack (2007), Gerakos (2007), Cen (2010), and Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2012) exam-
ine the determinants of CEO inside debt and its pension and deferred compensation components.
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and Wang (2011) and Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013) find that larger CEO inside
debt holdings are associated with lower costs of public and bank debt and fewer restrictive
covenants.2 Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013) is closely related to our analysis in
the sense that they also emphasize different incentive horizons of CEO inside debt compo-
nents. We distinguish ourself by focusing on firms’ maturity decision of new debt issues.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine the influence of inside debt on
corporate debt maturity decisions, emphasizing the importance of the incentive horizon in
understanding how CEO inside debt affects corporate financial policies.
In fact, our finding on the role of CEO inside debt’s incentive horizon deepens the
understanding on the heterogeneity of the incentive effect provided by different compo-
nents of inside debt, i.e. deferred compensation and pension. On the one hand, Liu,
Mauer, and Zhang (2014) find that the positive relation between firms’ cash holdings
and CEOs’ deferred compensation is two to three times larger than the positive relation
between firms’ cash holdings and CEOs’ pension. On the other hand, Anantharaman,
Fang, and Gong (2013) find that the effect of inside debt on bank loan contract design
is driven by a specific type of pension plans – Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans
(hereinafter, SERPs). The underlying reason is that deferred compensation entitles ex-
ecutives to flexible withdrawal schedules which often start before retirement (Ananthara-
man, Fang, and Gong (2013)). While the withdrawal flexibility of deferred compensation
makes CEOs with large deferred compensation want to save a great amount of cash as a
buffer, such flexibility causes great uncertainty for outside creditors to evaluate any po-
tential incentive-alignment effect from deferred compensation. SERPs, on the contrary, is
usually unsecured and unfunded, and CEOs can only start to withdraw its balance at or
2Different from these studies, Campbell, Galpin, and Johnson (2015) examine the impact of CEO inside
debt level change on equity value from an optimal contracting view and find that equity value increases as
firms move towards the predicted optimal CEO inside debt level, consistent with the theoretical predictions
in Edmans and Liu (2011).
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after retirement, which effectively guarantees outside creditors that CEOs would behave
conservatively in a relatively long period of time.
This chapter also adds to the literature of how executive compensation incentives in-
fluence corporate capital structure and debt maturity structure. Berger, Ofek, and Yermack
(1997) find that firms with weak managerial incentive avoid debt. Novaes (2003) shows
that the optimal level of leverage for shareholders differs from that chosen by entrenched
managers. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005) find that managerial stock owner-
ship is inversely related to debt maturity. Benmelech (2006) theoretically and empirically
documents that managerial entrenchment is positively associated with a higher portion of
long-term debt. The article that is closely related to ours is Brockman, Martin, and Unlu
(2010). They find a significantly positive (negative) relation between CEO portfolio vegas
(deltas) and the proportion of short-term debt, consistent with the view that short-maturity
debt mitigates agency costs of debt related to asset substitution. However, unlike our
analysis, Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) do not study the relation among CEO debt
compensation incentive, associated incentive horizon, and corporate debt maturity deci-
sion. We follow Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) and control for any impact of CEO
equity compensation incentives throughout our analysis.
Next, our study contributes to the literature on debt maturity structure. Barclay and
Smith (1995) find that growth options and firm size are negatively related to debt matu-
rity. Stohs and Mauer (1996) document a series of findings: large firms with less risk
and longer-term asset maturities have longer-term debt; firms with more positive earnings
surprises use more short-term debt; and there is a non-monotonic relation between debt
maturity and bond rating, with high or very low rated firms having shorter-term debt. Us-
ing data on new public issues, Guedes and Opler (1996) find that large and highly rated
firms borrow at both ends of the maturity range while risky firms borrow in the middle
of the maturity range. Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) and Johnson (2003) explicitly
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account for the potential simultaneity between leverage and maturity in the simultaneous
equations model. Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) find that both leverage and debt matu-
rity are negatively related to growth opportunities. Johnson (2003) identifies an attenuation
effect of short-term debt on the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage.3 Bil-
lett, King, and Mauer (2007) account for the endogenous choices of covenant structure,
leverage, and maturity, and find that short-term debt and covenants are substitutes in con-
trolling stockholder-bondholder conflicts over the exercise of growth options. Recently,
Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that firms with traded credit default swap (CDS) contracts
on their debt have higher leverage and longer debt maturities, consistent with the idea that
suppliers’ ability to hedge risk through CDS boosts the supply side of credit markets. In
addition, Benmelech, Kroszner, and Ram (2000) finds that debt maturity increases in asset
liquidation value, which is measured by asset salability in nineteenth-century American
railroads. Following Guedes and Opler (1996), we examine the maturity of incremental
debt issuances. Our paper adds to the debt maturity literature by showing how and when
CEOs’ debt compensation incentives affect firms’ debt maturity.
Finally, in a broad perspective, our empirical results add to the literature on managerial
incentive horizon. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) find that already-vested stock is related
to corporate fraud. Gao (2010) finds that old CEOs and CEOs with a higher amount of
restricted stock and options that become vested during a given year have higher abnormal
returns at acquisition announcements, are less likely to use equity to pay for the transac-
tions, and experience inferior post-merger stock performance in the long run. Edmans,
Fang, and Lewellen (2013) document a negative relation between the imminent vesting of
a CEO’s equity and corporate investment in R&D. Chi, Gupta, and Johnson (2011) esti-
mate the overall vesting horizon of managers’ equity incentive compensation and provide
3Johnson (2003) confirms Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003)’s finding that leverage is negatively related
to growth opportunities, but he did not find the negative relation between debt maturity and growth opportu-
nities, which he attributes to the multicollinearity problem in the maturity regression.
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the first empirical evidence of a link between the time horizon of firms’ managerial com-
pensation incentives and their firms’ information environment quality.4 While all these
studies focus on the horizon of CEO equity incentive, we look at the horizon of CEO debt
compensation and its relation to firms’ financial policies.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We review the literature that
motivates our analysis and develop our hypotheses in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 describes
the data. Section 3.3 presents results of our main tests and robustness analysis. Finally,
Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1 Prior literature and hypotheses
Equity-based compensation aims at aligning the interests of managers with those of
shareholders. However, these compensation mechanisms may exacerbate stockholder-
debtholder conflicts, raising agency costs of debt that are eventually born by stockholders
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Existing empirical studies find evidence that is consis-
tent with the view that CEO incentives derived from equity-based compensation, option
pay in particular, increase firm risk. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) document that the
resulting increase in the vega of a CEO’s compensation motivates him to pursue riskier in-
vestment and financing policies. Employing different empirical designs to address the en-
dogeneity issues, a series of recent papers (i.e. Chava and Purnanandam (2010), Gormley,
Matsa, and Milbourn (2013), Shue and Townsend (2013)) find causal effect of managerial
option pay on risk taking.5 As a result, managerial option ownership raises the agency
costs of debt.6
Literature has shown that short-term debt can be a prominent instrument for mitigating
4Also see Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2014).
5An exception is Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012), who find that options do not affect risk taking.
6Empirical evidence includes: Ortiz-Molina (2006) documents a positive relation between credit spreads
and managerial stock and option ownership. Daniel and Martin (2004) find a positive relation between credit
spreads and the volatility sensitivity (vega) of CEO compensation. Billett, Mauer, and Zhang (2010) find
that stock price (bond price) drops (rises) in the change in delta and rises (drops) in the change in vega.
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the severity and costs of stockholder-debtholder conflicts. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet
(1980) show theoretically that short-term debt can reduce the severity of asset substitution
problems because it is less sensitive to changes in firm risk than long-term debt. Leland
and Toft (1996) show that short-term debt can increase incentive compatibility between
stockholders and debtholders and minimize the agency costs of asset substitution. Stulz
(2000) and Rajan and Winton (1995) point out that short-term debt can force managers to
face regular monitoring by market participants, such as investors and underwriters, which
may also prevent managers from taking on risk. Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) pro-
vide empirical support for these theories. Specifically, using CEO compensation portfolio
vegas (deltas) as the proxies for CEOs’ risk taking (dis)incentives, they find that the pro-
portion of short-term debt is positively (negatively) related to CEO compensation portfolio
vegas (deltas). In addition, they find that short-term debt attenuates the higher cost of debt
induced by CEO portfolio vegas.
Shortening debt maturity is not, however, without costs. Diamond (1991b, 1993)
and Sharpe (1991) develop models in which too much debt maturing in the short term
creates a risk of suboptimal liquidation because lenders ignore the full value of control
rents. Increasing the risk of suboptimal liquidation can be viewed as increasing expected
bankruptcy costs, which is predicted to reduce optimal leverage. Consistently, Johnson
(2003) finds that the increased liquidity risk of shorter debt maturity negatively affects
leverage, which in turn limits firms’ ability to use short debt maturity to reduce the un-
derinvestment problems. Liquidity risk stems from the possibility that firms experience
negative shocks around the times they need to refinance, and also from the possibility of
negative shocks that affect lenders such as the recent financial crisis. Thus, firms face a
tradeoff of greater risk when they attempt to reduce the severity and costs of stockholder-
debtholder conflicts by shortening debt maturity.
Recent development in agency theory argues that adding debt-like compensation (i.e.
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inside debt) in executive compensation package discourages managers from taking ex-
cess risks and mitigates stockholder-debtholder conflicts. The basic idea originated with
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and has been formally theorized by Edmans and Liu (2011).
By considering simultaneously agency costs of debt and equity, Edmans and Liu (2011)
show that debt-like components in executive compensation are more effective in aligning
managers’ incentive with those of firms’ debtholders than salaries and bonuses (i.e. cash
compensations). This is because, for inside debt arrangements, a firm promises to pay ex-
ecutives fixed amounts at a later point in time (e.g. upon their retirement). These promised
future payments are unsecured and typically underfunded, and hence resemble risky debt
claims against the firm. As a result, their value not only depends upon the incidence of
bankruptcy as cash compensations do, but also links to the value of assets in bankruptcy,
which renders managers’ objectives similar to debtholders’. In other words, inside debt
effectively aligns managers’ interests with debtholders’.
Linking the literature on how debt maturity can reduce stockholder-debtholder con-
flicts to the literature on how CEO inside debt can reduce those conflicts, we posit that
firms with greater levels of CEO inside debt can employ debt with longer maturity in
corporate capital structures. If a firm can reduce the severity of stockholder-debtholder
conflicts via the use of inside debt compensation to its CEO, it can avoid having to shorten
debt maturity and the associated risks and costs of doing so. The basic hypothesis is
straightforward, but it requires refinement to become testable.
First and foremost, the positive relation between debt maturity and inside debt hinges
on the incentive horizon of inside debt compensation. If CEOs can withdraw their debt
compensation before other corporate debt matures, i.e., if it has a shorter maturity than the
maturity of the other corporate debt, it eliminates the risk that these CEOs will lose benefits
if their firms go bankrupt after withdrawal. Consequently, inside debt with maturity shorter
than that of corporate debt is effectively senior to that corporate debt if bankruptcy occurs
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in the short term, which renders the incentive-alignment effect of inside debt weak or
even negligible for creditors whose claims mature after inside debt. As a result, long-term
debtholders perceive short maturity CEO inside debt as having little incentive alignment
effect (even if it is unfunded), and as a result, we must differentiate between firms with
short maturity inside debt and those with long maturity inside debt.
Furthermore, the incentive alignment effect of a CEO’s inside debt relies on its magni-
tude relative to the CEO’s equity holdings and the firms overall leverage ratio. Edmans and
Liu (2011) show that, when an executive’s compensation includes both debt-like claims
and equity-like claims on the firm, his incentives vary with the relative importance of debt-
versus equity-based compensation in his pay package. Specifically, a CEO should be debt
biased if she has a leverage ratio (her inside debt / her equity positions in the firm) that
is greater than the firms debt to equity ratio (Edmans and Liu (2011)); this is termed a
relative CEO leverage ratio greater than 1.0. Conversely, a CEO with a relative leverage
ratio below 1.0 should be equity biased in her decision-making.
Taking into consideration the two important dimensions of inside debt, we first hypoth-
esize that among firms with long-term inside debt, debt maturity for firms with debt-biased
CEO relative leverage ratios is greater than for firms with equity-biased CEO relative
leverage ratios, which captures the debt vs. equity bias dimension of inside debt among
firms for which inside debt maturity is long enough to matter. Second, we hypothesize
that among firms with debt-biased CEO relative leverage ratios, debt maturity for firms
with long-term inside debt is greater than for firms with short-term inside debt. As noted
above, inside debt with shorter maturity than that of corporate debt is effectively senior to
the claims of outside creditors, which mutes incentive-alignment effect of inside debt for
long-term lenders and limits firms’ ability to borrow long-term debt. This hypothesis cap-
tures the importance of the inside debt maturity dimension among the set of firms whose
CEOs should have a debt bias. Third, we hypothesize that among firms with equity-biased
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CEO relative leverage ratios, debt maturity for firms with long-term inside debt is less than
for firms with short-term inside debt; this hypothesis captures the point that stockholder-
debtholder conflicts should be greater for firms with long-term inside debt levels that are
equity biased. To summarize:
Hypothesis 1: Among firms with long maturity inside debt, the maturity of corporate
debt issues is longer for firms with debt-biased CEOs than for firms with equity-biased
CEOs.
Hypothesis 2: Among firms with debt-biased CEOs, the maturity of corporate debt
issues is longer for firms with long-term CEO inside debt than for firms with short-term
CEO inside debt.
Hypothesis 3: Among firms with equity-biased CEOs, the maturity of corporate debt
issues is shorter for firms with long-term CEO inside debt than for firms with short-term
CEO inside debt.
3.2 Sample construction and description statistics
3.2.1 Sample construction
We rely on four data sources: Thomson One, Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp, Com-
pustat, and CRSP databases. We obtain CEO compensation and ownership information
from the ExecuComp database for the period over year 2006 to year 2011. The Execu-
Comp database covers firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, S&P SmallCap 600, and
other firms that are not currently in the S&P indexes but that were previously in one of the
indexes. The sample period starts in 2006 because SEC started to require firms to disclose
the present value of benefits accrued under pension plans and other deferred compensa-
tion plans in 2006. We extract information of new debt issues from Thomson One from
year 2007 to year 2012. Financial accounting data come from Compustat annual files
and monthly stock return information is from CRSP. We match each debt issue with its
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corresponding firm’s financial and compensation information at the latest fiscal year end
before the debt issuance date. Moreover, to construct our inside debt maturity proxy as
discussed below, we hand-collect data from proxy statements on the existence of lump-
sum options for SERPs. Following Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013), we identify
lump-sum payout options when the firm discloses that its CEO either has the option or is
required to claim benefits as a lump sum under SERPs.
We start with identifying the CEO for each firm in ExecuComp from 2006 to 2011.
We require firms to have non-missing values for CEOs’ inside debt, stock ownership, and
complete compensation data necessary to calculate the price and volatility sensitivities of
the CEO’s compensation portfolio. We then match the sample to Compustat and CRSP
and require sufficient data in the Compustat and CRSP to calculate the dependent and
control variables as discussed below. We exclude firms in the financial service industries
(Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000-6999). For each firm, we then obtain
information of new debt issues from Thomson One. We winsorize all continuous variables
at 1% and 99% of each variable’s sample distribution to mitigate the impact of outliers.
The final sample includes 4,399 new debt issues by 892 unique firms, including 43 Rule
144A issues, 196 private non-Rule 144A issues, 1,530 public issues, and 2,630 syndicated
issues.
Rather than using the maturity of all the debt on a firm’s balance sheet, we follow
Guedes and Opler (1996) and examine the maturity of corporate debt issues at the margin.
This incremental approach is well-suited to our study for a couple of reasons.7 First, our
predictions rely on whether creditors are able to perceive the incentive-alignment effect of
inside debt. As Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) argue, it is the incremental approach
that “allows us to take the perspective of a prospective creditor who analyzes the firm char-
7Other studies using the incremental approach include Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996), Hovakimian, Opler,
and Titman (2001), and Denis and Mihov (2003).
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acteristics that will determine the maturity structure of new lending.” Second, Guedes and
Opler (1996) emphasize that, “Another advantage of the incremental approach is that it can
identify the determinants of financing choices at all points of the maturity spectrum. This
allows us to characterize which types of firms inhabit various parts of the debt maturity
spectrum more precisely than can be done using cross-sectional debt maturity information
from the COMPUSTAT tapes.” Accordingly, we believe that the specific maturity of cor-
porate debt issues better identifies the type of incentives underlying the CEO. By contrast,
the widely used debt maturity proxies, such as the proportion of debt maturing within three
years, are built upon accounting variables and reflect the accumulation of past investment
and financing decisions, and so may contaminate our results.
In order to test our hypotheses, for the dependent variable, we measure the maturity of
corporate debt issues in years. For the key variables of interest and other control variables,
we now define them as follows.8
Debt compensation incentives: For a firm-year, we first use ExecuComp compensation
data and compute CEO inside debt as the sum of pension value and deferred compensation.
Pension value is the aggregate actuarial present value of the executive’s accumulated bene-
fit under the company’s pension plans and deferred compensation is the aggregate balance
in non-tax-qualified deferred compensation plans, both of which are measured at the end
of a fiscal year. We then compute the value of the CEO’s equity holdings, which is the sum
of the value of the CEO’s common stock holdings in the firm and the dividend-adjusted
Black-Scholes value of option holdings, all measured at the end of the fiscal year. Both
stock and option holdings include current year grants and all accumulated stock and option
holdings. Finally, the CEO relative leverage ratio is the CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio divided
by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, where CEO debt is the value of inside debt, CEO equity
is the value of the CEO’s equity holdings, the firm’s debt is the sum of long-term debt plus
8We also provide detailed definitions of all variables and corresponding data source in Appendix E.
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debt in current liabilities, and the firm’s equity is the market value of equity. Our measure
of CEO inside debt incentive is an indicator variable set equal to one if the CEO relative
leverage ratio exceeds one and zero otherwise. Consistent with Edmans and Liu (2011),
this variable delineates CEOs’ compensation portfolio incentive between debt-biased CEO
relative leverage ratios versus equity-biased CEO relative leverage ratios.
The maturity of inside debt: To examine the importance of CEO incentive horizon
from inside debt, we need a measure that captures the horizons of both CEOs’ pension
and deferred compensation. The ideal measure would also capture the relative size of the
incentives at each horizon, as the duration measure for managers’ equity incentive in Chi,
Gupta, and Johnson (2011) and Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2014). Unfor-
tunately, due to a lack of disclosure requirements, firms seldom disclose the withdrawal
schedules for their CEOs’ deferred compensation and there is not a machine readable
database providing further detailed classification of pension plans.9
We operationalize the concept of the incentive horizon of CEO inside debt using a
dichotomous variable (Short) classifying inside debt into short-term versus long-term. We
call that the CEO has short-term inside debt if his age is greater than 52 and his SERPs, if
any, has a lump-sum payout option (Lumpsum= 1). With respect to choosing age 52 as the
cutoff, it is because we want our measure (Short) to be able to reflect collectively all the
ex-ante expectations of outside creditors on the likelihood of CEOs’ retirement. First, 62
and 65 are, respectively, the early and normal retirement age for claiming social security
benefits in the U.S. More importantly, from reading SEC filings, we observe that it is often
the case that firms allow their CEOs to claim pension benefits at an age as early as 55,
albeit at reduced rates.10 The lump-sum option allows a CEO to withdraw all her pension
9Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013) provide a detailed discussion on the CEO debt compensation
practice in the U.S.
10Our results are qualitatively similar when using alternative cuttoffs around the age of 52, for classifica-
tion of short inside debt maturity.
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under SERPs at retirement. The lump-sum payout option helps us exclude cases where the
exiting CEO has a large pension to draw through a relatively long period of time even after
retirement when defining short inside debt maturity. To reduce future risk for her wealth
in the pension, the CEO can choose to stay on the firm’s board after retirement or select a
risk-averse successor when she retires. Such behaviors effectively lengthen the incentive
horizon of inside debt. Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013) show that, the lump-sum
feature, by allowing a CEO to claim his SERPs benefits all at once, renders CEO interests
aligned closer only with short-term bank loans whose claims happen before the CEO’s.
Therefore, we account for the lump-sum payout option in the SERPs when approximating
the incentive horizon of CEO inside debt.
There is another reason for taking into account of the lump-sum payout option. Anan-
tharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013) show that among all components of CEOs’ inside debt
compensation, it is pension, and in particular, SERPs that mainly drives the relation be-
tween inside debt and loan contract design. To the extent that it is also SERPs that drives
the association between inside debt and corporate debt maturity, and as the ExecuComp
database does not provide further detailed information on pension components, account-
ing for the lump-sum payout option in our inside debt maturity measure at least indicates
which CEOs have SERPs in his debt compensation, which in turn reduce the noisiness of
our incentive measure to some extent and increase the power of our tests.
Equity compensation incentives: Following (Core and Guay, 1999, 2002), and Ed-
mans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), we compute the CEO’s portfolio price sensitivity (i.e.
delta) as the change in the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio due to a 1% in-
crease in the price of the firm’s common stock. We compute the CEO’s portfolio volatility
sensitivity (i.e. vega) as the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s option grants and any
option holdings for a 1% change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns.11
11Core and Guay (1999)’s findings suggest that the CEO’s combined stock and option portfolio vega can
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Following Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010), we use natural logarithm transformations
of CEO delta and vega in our empirical tests.12
Control variables: We define leverage as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current
liabilities divided by the market value of the firm. We control for leverage because short-
term debt increases liquidity risk, which makes firms with high leverage choose more
long-term debt to avoid suboptimal liquidation (Diamond (1991b)). We also calculate the
proportion of debt maturing in more than 3 years (LT 3). In the robustness check, we will
control for the maturity structure of existing debt in a firm’s capital structure. It is possible
that marginal financing choices are linked with prior financing decisions (Denis and Mihov
(2003)).
As in Johnson (2003), we use net sales (in constant 2006 dollars) as a proxy for firm
size and I also include its square as proxies for credit quality. Diamond (1991b) predicts an
inverse U-shape relation between debt maturity and credit quality. Regarding credit qual-
ity, we also include three indicator variables. The first one is set equal to one if the firm has
no existing S&P long-term debt ratings (NotRated), zero otherwise. Conditional on having
S&P long-term debt ratings, we further differentiate between investment grade firms and
speculative grade firms by adding an investment grade rating dummy (InvestmentGrade),
which indicates whether or not the firms have an existing debt rating of BBB or higher.
The third dummy variable (Zscore Dum) indicates whether Altman (1968)’s Z-score is
greater than 1.81. Firms with long-term debt (especially investment grade) ratings and
higher Z-Scores are likely to have higher credit quality and can afford to borrow long-term
debt.
We include the book value-weighted measure of asset maturity (Asset Mat), defined
by Stohs and Mauer (1996). The maturity of long-term assets is measured as gross prop-
be precisely estimated using the option portfolio vega since the stock portfolio vega is relatively small.
12Specifically, we define Log(delta)=Log(1+delta) and Log(vega)=Log(1+vega). We add one to each
variable before taking logarithm since both measures can be zero.
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erty, plant, and equipment (PP&E) divided by depreciation expense, while the maturity
of current assets is measured as current assets divided by the cost of goods sold. Total
asset maturity is the weighted sum of these measures where (gross PP&E/total assets) is
the weight for long-term assets and (current assets/total assets) is the weight for current
assets. Myers (1977) argues that underinvestment problems can be reduced by matching
the maturity of assets to the maturity of liabilities, suggesting a negative relation between
asset maturity and the maturity of debt issues. Myers (1977) also predicts that short-term
debt should be positively related to growth opportunities. Hence we add market-to-book
ratio (M/B) as a proxy for growth opportunities. The market-to-book ratio is defined as
the market value of assets divided by book value of assets, where market value of assets
is calculated by replacing book value of common equity with market value of common
equity.
We define managerial stock ownership (Own) as the number of shares owned by the
CEO scaled by total shares outstanding at the fiscal year end. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and
Raman (2005) document a negative relation between managerial stock ownership and debt
maturity, supporting the view that managers whose incentives are aligned with those of
stockholders are more willing to subject themselves to the frequent monitoring by short-
term debt. We also include the regulated firm dummy (Reg Dum) as Barclay and Smith
(1995) argue that managers of regulated firms have less discretion over investment. As a
result, regulated firms face less debt agency problems and can borrow longer-term debt.
Flannery (1986) argues that high quality firms can signal their private positive infor-
mation and distinguish themselves from low quality firms by issuing short-term debt given
the costly roll-over risk of short-term debt. We thus include the abnormal earnings mea-
sure (Abn Earn), defined as the year-over-year change in the operating earnings per share
divided by the previous year’s share price, to test for signaling effects in debt maturity
choices. Following Johnson (2003), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005) and Brock-
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man, Martin, and Unlu (2010), we also control for asset return volatility (Std Ret) since it
might be an alternative measure for credit risk. Johnson (2003) argues that as cash flows
become more volatile, the probability of repaying debt decreases. While firms with highly
volatile cash flows might prefer long-term debt, bondholders may only be willing to lend
these firms short-term debt if bondholders perceive such risks. We follow Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, and Raman (2005) and calculate our asset return volatility measure as monthly stock
return standard deviation during the fiscal year multiplied by the ratio of the market value
of equity to the market value of assets.
Brick and Ravid (1985) show theoretically that the tax-shield value of long-term debt
is higher when the yield curve is upward sloping. This tax shield value is higher for firms
with high marginal tax rates. Their analysis predicts a positive relation between term
structure and the maturity of new debt issues and a negative relation between the maturity
of new debt issues and the tax shield dummy. We follow Brockman, Martin, and Unlu
(2010) and include a term structure measure (Term), calculated as the difference between
the yield on 10-year government bonds and the yield on 6-month government bonds at
the fiscal year end. We follow Johnson (2003) and include a net operating loss dummy
variable (NOL Dum).13 Lastly, we control for the principal amount of each debt issue (in
constant 2006 dollars).
3.2.2 Description statistics
Panel A of D.1 shows the number of debt issues by year and by issue type. The full
sample includes 4,399 new issues over the 2007 to 2012 period, of which 2,630 (60%) are
syndicated loans and 1,530 (35%) are public issues. Private placements, including both
Rule 144A and Non-Rule 144A debt, account for only a little more than 5%. The heaviest
13We also control for the other tax dummy variable used in Johnson (2003), which indicates whether a
firm has investment tax credits. It is never significant in all of our regressions and it does not affect our
findings.
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issue volume in our sample took place in 2010 and 2011, both of which are mainly driven
by the increased syndicated loan issues. However, the number of syndicated loan issues
drops dramatically from 739 in 2011 to 274 in 2012.
Panel B of D.1 shows that the average (median) maturity of new issues is about 7 (5)
years. In comparison, the debt issues in Guedes and Opler (1996) have a mean (median)
maturity of 12 (10) years. The difference in maturity is probably due to sample differ-
ence. While Guedes and Opler (1996)’s sample consists of only public issues, our sample
includes public issues, private placements and syndicated loans. Moreover, there is signif-
icant variation of maturity across issue types. Rule 144A debt and syndicated loans have
shorter maturity than Non-Rule 144a and public debt at both the mean and the median
levels. In the bottom part of Panel B, pairwise mean and median maturity comparisons of
new issues across issue types are all significantly different from zero except one (Non-Rule
144A versus Public issues). Finally, the mean (median) principal amount of new issues in
our sample is $629 ($369) million. Among the four types of issues, the mean (median)
principal amount for the Non-Rule 144A issue is the smallest, only around $88 ($65) mil-
lion. The mean (median) principal amount is $479 ($332) million for the Rule 144A issue,
$585 ($450) million for the public issue, and $698 ($334) million for the syndicated loans.
Panel A of Table D.2 provides descriptive statistics for CEOs’ compensation and firm
characteristics. CEO mean inside debt compensation is around $9.6 millions and CEO
mean equity compensation is about $64.5 millions. In unreported results, CEO total inside
debt accounts for 19.9% of the total CEO compensation (i.e., the total of CEO debt and
equity compensation). With respect to the inside debt incentive measure (DE), there is
39% of the observations with a CEO relative leverage ratio above one, i.e., having a debt-
biased CEO relative leverage ratio. This indicates that a larger proportion of sample firms
have a CEO relative leverage ratio below one, consistent with the claim in Edmans and Liu
(2011) that usually granting relatively more equity compensation (i.e. equity bias) to CEOs
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is needed to induce their effort. While it is not used in the empirical tests below, we report
the sample distribution of the CEO relative leverage ratio (DE Ratio) for completeness.
We find that the mean (median) CEO-firm relative debt-to-equity ratio is 1.53 (0.59).14
With respect to the maturity of inside debt, there is 21.4% of our sample having short-term
inside debt. In addition, Log(delta) has a mean of 5.83 and Log(vega) has a mean of 4.27.
CEO’s stock ownership accounts for 1.1% of the total number of shares outstanding on
average.
The firm in the sample has mean (median) sales revenue of $17897 ($4676) million,
indicating that our sample contains very large firms.15 In the following regression analysis,
we use the natural log of sales to attenuate their effect. There is a high percentage (80%)
of our sample having long-term S&P bond ratings, among which, 62.6% has investment
grade rating. There is almost 82% of our sample with Altman (1968)’s zscore greater
than 1.81, as shown by the variable Zscore Dum. Collectively, on average, our sample
firms are large and have great credit quality. In addition, the mean (median) leverage in
the sample is 0.19 (0.16) and the mean (median) for the fraction of debt maturing beyond
three years is 0.66 (0.71). For the average issuer, its asset matures in 12.26 years and it has
a market-to-book ratio 1.71.
Panel B of Table D.2 reports Pearson correlation coefficients among debt maturity, in-
side debt, and other control variables. The correlation between debt maturity (Maturity)
and DE and DE Ratio are both significantly positive. The correlation between DE and
DE Ratio is 0.70, similar to what Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) report.
There is also a positive relation between debt maturity and delta, consistent with the re-
sult in Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010). In contrast, there is a positive correlation
14DE Ratio has been winsorized at 5% and 95% due to the large number of extreme observations at the
right tail of its distribution.
15For comparison, the rest of ExecuComp firms has mean (median) sales of $4,796 ($1,478) million.
Moreover, restricting their firms to have debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database
(FISD), Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) (Table V) report mean (median) sales of $4,504 ($1,419) million.
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between debt maturity and vega, opposite to the result in Brockman, Martin, and Unlu
(2010). CEO’s stock ownership (Own) is negatively related to debt maturity, consistent
with Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005). There is a significantly positive correla-
tion between asset maturity (Asset Mat) and debt maturity, consistent with the notion that
firms try to match the maturity of liabilities to their underlying assets. There is mixed
evidence between firms’ credit quality and debt maturity. While debt maturity is posi-
tively related to Log(sale) and InvestmentGrade and negatively related to Not Rated and
Std Ret, it is negatively related to Zscore Dum. Finally, Reg Dum is positively related to
debt maturity, indicating regulated firms can borrow longer-term debt. Note that however,
these univariate results should be interpreted with caution because we have not controlled
for other factors that are known to affect firms’ debt maturity choice.
3.3 Empirical results
In this section, we first discuss the empirical specification that we employ to test our
hypotheses. We then report regression results under these specifications, examining the
incentive effect on corporate debt maturity across groups based on CEO relative lever-
age ratio and the incentive horizon. We subsequently turn to subsample tests to examine
whether the relation between corporate debt maturity and CEO inside debt is stronger
among firms for which the amelioration of stockholder-debtholder conflicts is expected to
be large. Lastly, we report robustness checks.
3.3.1 Empirical specification
To test the three hypotheses, we run several pooled cross-sectional OLS regressions
using the following model:
Maturityi,t = β0+β1DEi,t−1+β2Shorti,t−1+β3DEi,t−1 ∗Shorti,t−1+ΘiXi,t−1+ εi,t ,
(3.1)
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where the dependent variable, Maturityi,t , is the maturity of corporate debt issued by firm
i in year t. Our variables of interest are the inside debt dummy DEi,t−1, the incentive
horizon of inside debt Shorti,t−1, and the interaction term between DEi,t−1 and Shorti,t−1.
Xi,t−1 contains the control variables as discussed in Section 3.2.1. εi,t is the error term.
All the right-hand side variables are measured at the last year before the year of debt
issuances. For all specifications, Xi,t−1 includes year dummies that are employed to ac-
count for economy-wide shocks.Following the literature (see Brockman, Martin, and Unlu
(2010)), we add issue type fixed effects in some specifications to alleviate the concern that
any association between the maturity of corporate debt and inside debt is driven by the debt
source consideration. Nonetheless, to the extent that short maturity debt heavily overlaps
with a specific debt type, bank loans for example, issue type fixed effects would work
against us finding any significant effect of inside debt on corporate debt maturity. Further-
more, all the t-statistics are computed based on robust standard errors that are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.
There is a large fraction of our sample (16.7%) with zero CEO inside debt. It is pos-
sible that there are unobservable determinants of firms’ self-selection into nonzero CEO
debt compensation that would also affect firms’ debt maturity choice. One potential factor,
for example, is managerial power. Gerakos (2007) and Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014) doc-
ument that CEOs in firms with weak corporate governance are associated with more debt
compensation. Furthermore, the changes in SEC disclosure requirements in 2006 were
motivated by the claim that pensions offer substantially greater opportunities for manage-
rial rent extraction than other compensation mechanisms (e.g., Colvin (2001), Bebchuk
and Jackson (2005)). Given that managerial power facilitates managerial entrenchment,
which in turn is positively associated with the portion of long-term debt in a firm’s capital
structure (Benmelech (2006)), the OLS estimation could possibly suffer from an omitted
variable problem.
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To make sure that our OLS results are not driven by omitting private information that
makes firms self-select nonzero CEO debt compensation, we examine specification (3.1)
using the Heckman (1979) model to correct for the selection bias.16 We employ the two-
step estimation including a first-stage Probit debt compensation selection model and a
second-stage debt maturity model, i.e. equation (3.1). In the first-stage, we model a firm’s
decision of granting its CEO debt compensation based on firm characteristics employed
in Gerakos (2007), and Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014). Specifically, we model granting
debt compensation as a function of firms’ leverage, market-to-book ratio, R&D expenses,
net sale, fixed asset, return on assets, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm
has negative operating cash flow, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has net
operating loss carry-forwards on its balance sheet, a dummy variable indicating whether
the CEO is the chair of the board, the G-index, and CEO age. The inverse Mills ratios
obtained from the first-stage Probit model captures the unobservables that contribute to
a firms decision on whether or not to have positive CEO debt compensation, which is
included in the second-stage regression to correct for the selection bias.
3.3.2 Main results
Table D.3 reports the results from both the pooled cross-sectional regressions and the
Heckman (1979) model. To directly gauge the statistical and economic importance of our
multivariate findings, in Panel A we employ the estimated coefficients from the Heckman
(1979) model (Panel B, Model (4)) and calculate the net effect on the maturity of corporate
debt issues of inside debt across groups based on the CEO incentive bias, DE, and the
incentive horizon of CEO inside debt, Short. First, among the set of firms with inside
debt maturity long enough to matter (Short = 0), we find that debt maturity for firms with
16The survey by Prabhala and Li (2007) build the connection between econometric models of self-
selection and private information models in corporate finance and claim that “.... models of self-selection
represent one way of incorporating and controlling for unobservable private information that influences cor-
porate finance decisions.”
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debt-biased CEO incentive (DE = 1) is greater than for firms with equity-biased CEO
incentive (DE = 0), which is consistent with our Hypothesis 1. This difference is not
only statistically significant at 5% level, but also economically meaningful. Firms whose
CEOs have debt-biased inside debt levels issue debt with a maturity of approximately one
year longer than firms whose CEOs have equity-biased inside debt level. Given a sample
median maturity of 5 years, the effect of debt bias is an approximately 20% increase in the
maturity of corporate debt issues.
Second, we show that, among firms whose CEOs have debt-biased incentive (DE = 1),
debt maturity for firms with long-term inside debt (Short = 0) is more than a half year
longer than for firms with short-term inside debt (Short = 1) and it is almost significant
at 10% level. Based on the one-sided z test (unreported), we cannot reject the null that
the difference is positive at 5% level. Therefore, the result is consistent with our Hypoth-
esis 2 – the debt maturity for firms whose CEOs have long-term debt-biased incentive is
greater than the debt maturity for firms whose CEOs have short-term debt-biased incen-
tive. It emphasizes the importance of the inside debt maturity dimension in measuring the
effectiveness of inside debt in mitigating stockholder-debtholder conflicts.
Third, we find that for firms whose CEOs have long-term inside debt level (Short = 0)
that is equity-biased (DE = 0), their debt maturity on average is significantly one year less
than the debt maturity for firms whose CEOs have short-term inside debt level (Short = 1)
that is equity-biased (DE = 0). The results are consistent with our Hypothesis 3 and the
underlying notion that stockholder-debtholder conflicts should be greater for firms with
long-term inside debt levels that are equity biased.
To make sure the findings are not model specific, we now turn to OLS estimation
results in Model (1)-Model(3) of Panel B.17 Model (1) only includes inside debt dummy
17The difference in the number of observations between the OLS model and the Heckman model is due to
missing values of G-index that is used in the first-stage of the Heckman model. We rerun OLS regressions
on the Heckman’s sample and obtain similar results. The results are available upon request.
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(DE), incentive horizon of inside debt (Short), and their product (DE ∗ Short). Model
(2) adds to the three key variables other control variables that have been shown in the
literature to influence firms’ debt maturity choice. Model (3) further controls for issue
type fixed effects. First, the coefficient on DE is positive and significant across all the
three models, which is consistent with our hypothesis 1–for firms have long-term inside
debt maturity, debt maturity is greater for firms with debt-biased CEO incentive (DE = 1),
relative to firms with equity-biased CEO incentive (DE = 0). Second, the coefficient on
Short, which represents the incremental impact of long-term equity-biased inside debt
over short-term equity-biased inside debt, is highly significant at 1% level in the model
(1) and weakly significant in Model (3) at 11% level. Lastly, for impact of long-term
debt-biased incentive versus short-term debt-biased incentive, in unreported results, it is
significant at 10% level based on one-sided z test once we control for the issue type fixed
effects (model (3)), while we find this effect is significant at 5% level without issue type
fixed effect(model (2)). As discussed above, adding issue type effect would attenuate our
findings.
With respect to other right-hand-side variables, to facilitate discussion, we focus on
Model (4) in Panel A. Unlike Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010), we do not find any sig-
nificant relation between debt maturity and either Log(delta) or Log(vega), which might
be due to different sample periods. The coefficient on Asset Mat is significantly positive,
which is consistent with Myers (1977)’s argument that firms try to match the maturity of
their assets and liabilities so that they can reduce underinvestment problems. However,
in terms of economic significance, its impact is relatively small. Also consistent with
Myers (1977), firms with high market-to-book ratio use more short-term debt to mitigate
the underinvestment problem. Utility firms can borrow longer-term debt since managers
of regulated firms have less discretion over investment policy. Finally, IssueAmount is
negatively and significantly related to the maturity of new debt issues.
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In summary, we find support for all of our hypotheses, especially for hypothesis 1 that
among firms with long-term inside debt, the debt maturity for firms with debt-biased CEO
incentive is greater than the one for firms with equity-biased CEO incentive. We now turn
to additional tests that should provide further support for our hypotheses.
3.3.3 Subsample analysis sorted on market-to-book ratio
In particular, we sort the sample on firms’ market-to-book ratios, and re-estimate the
regressions for high and low market-to-book firms. We expect that the effect between CEO
inside debt and corporate debt maturity should be stronger for high market-to-book firms.
First and foremost, managers are more able to take excessive risks when choosing among
new investments than assets already in place. The second reason is that high market-
to-book firms might have greater underinvestment problems, which can be mitigated if
managerial incentives are aligned closer with debtholders. As such, the need for the use
of short-term debt to solve the underinvestment problem is reduced. Collectively, we
expect to find stronger evidence for the three hypotheses among firms with high growth
opportunities than among firms with low growth opportunities.
Table D.4 presents the subsample results for high market-to-book firms versus for low
market-to-book firms. Model (1) is the pooled cross-sectional regression with both year
and issue type fixed effects. Model (2) is the Heckman (1979) model. Again, we focus on
Panel A which uses the estimated coefficients from the Heckman (1979) model (Panel B,
Model (2)) and calculates the net effect on the corporate debt maturity of inside debt across
groups based on CEOs’ incentive bias and their incentive horizon, just as in Table D.3
Panel A. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the results documented in Table D.3
hold only among firms with high market-to-book ratios. The net effects across different
groups are in fact stronger than the counterparts based on the full sample as reported by
Table D.3.
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Specifically, among the set of firms with inside debt maturity long enough to matter
(Short = 0), we find that the debt maturity for firms with debt-biased CEO incentive (DE =
1) is almost one year greater than the debt maturity for firms with equity-biased CEO
incentive (DE = 0). This is similar to what we find in Table D.3 and provides support
for our hypothesis 1. Consistent with our Hypothesis 2, among firms with debt-biased
CEO incentive (DE = 1), debt maturity for firms with long-term inside debt (Short = 0)
is greater than debt maturity for firms with short-term inside debt (Short = 1) and it is
significant at 5% level. In terms of economic significance, among firms with great growth
opportunity, those whose CEOs have long-term debt-biased inside debt levels issue debt
with a maturity of more than one year longer than those with short-term debt-biased inside
debt level. Consistent with our Hypothesis 3, for firms with long-term equity-biased inside
debt, their debt maturity on average is 1.66 years shorter than the debt maturity for firms
with short-term equity-biased inside debt and this effect is significant at 5% level. Last
but not least, in Model (1) where both year and issue fixed effects are controlled for in the
pooled cross-sectional OLS estimation, these results also hold for firms with high market-
to-book ratio, only except that the coefficient on Short is marginally significant based on
two-sided t tests.
So far, the results from the two sections collectively provide strong support for our
hypotheses. Our findings are consistent with the view that stockholder-debtholder conflicts
fundamentally drive how incentive effect of inside debt and its incentive horizon interplay
with corporate debt maturity.
3.3.4 Robustness check
3.3.4.1 Controlling for existing debt maturity structure
Because the existing debt maturity structure has been shown to be associated with
many of the same firm characteristics that we include in our tests (e.g. Johnson (2003),
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and Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010)), and given that firms probably take existing debt
maturity structure into account when deciding the maturity of new debt issues, we address
this issue by controlling for the firm’s existing debt maturity structure—the proportion
of existing debt maturing in more than three years (LT 3). We rerun the regression for
each specification with LT 3 added. We report the results in Table D.5. Panel A contains
regressions on the full samples, which is similar to Table D.3. Panel B contains regressions
conducted on subsamples sorted by mark-to-book ratio, comparable to Table D.4. The
results are consistent with our earlier findings and are mainly driven by firms with high
market-to-book ratio.
3.3.4.2 Bias-corrected nearest neighbor matching estimator
In this section, we examine the effect of incentive bias change on the maturity of new
debt issues, while holding the incentive horizon type the same (or vice versa). We employ a
matched firm, difference-in-difference approach. To illustrate the idea, take as an example
firms whose managerial incentives switch from long equity bias to long debt bias. We call
these firms the treatment group. Each firm in the treatment group is required to have at
least one debt issue before and after the managerial incentive bias change, respectively.
The potential set of control firms are those whose CEOs’ incentive is always long equity-
biased during the sample period. We match each firm in the treatment group with one
firm from that set by nearest-neighbor matching and we match with replacement. The
matching is performed on the last firm-year right before the managerial incentive of each
firm in the treatment group changes. We match on firm- and CEO-level covariates (as well
as two-digit sic code and year, if possible) that (1) determine the use of inside debt; and (2)
determine the maturity of new debt issues. Eventually, we compare the difference in pre-
and post-change debt maturity of each firm in the treatment group to that of corresponding
matched control firm.
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As matching on issue type and year would dramatically reduces the matched sample
size, and as maturity varies widely across debt types, we address this issue by obtaining
debt type- and year-adjusted maturity for each debt issue using the full sample. Next, I
calculate the weighted maturity per firm-year as some firms have multiple debt issuances
within a year. The weight is the principal amount of an issuance divided by the total
principal amount issued by that firm in that year. With the weighted maturity measure,
I keep one observation for each firm year. For the matching technique, we use the bias-
corrected nearest neighbor matching estimator approach proposed by Abadie and Imbens
(2007), which adjusts the difference of the outcome variable within matches for differences
in the values of matching covariates to correct for the bias induced by inexact matching in
finite samples.
The results on sample average treatment effect (SATE) are presented in Table D.6.
The evidence strongly supports Hypothesis 1 that among firms with long maturity inside
debt, the maturity of corporate debt issues is longer for firms with debt-biased CEOs than
for firms with equity-biased CEOs. Specifically, when a firm switches from long-term
equity-biased incentive to long-term debt-biased incentive, its new debt maturity on aver-
age increases by two years, relative to a firm that is always under long-term equity biased
incentive. On the contrary, when a firm switches from long-term debt biased incentive to
long-term equity biased incentive, its new debt maturity on average decreases by one and a
half years, when comparing to a firm that is always under long-term debt biased incentive.
However, for Hypothesis 2 and 3, although the firm-matched, difference-in-difference es-
timates have the predicted sign and the magnitudes are economically meaningful, none of
them is statistically significant, probably due to very limited sample size.
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3.4 Conclusion
On top of cash and equity compensation, CEOs in the United States are often compen-
sated with debt, including deferred compensation and pension, or collectively inside debt.
Built upon the literature on how debt maturity can reduce stockholder-debtholder conflicts
with the literature on how CEO inside debt can reduce those conflicts, we examine the re-
lation between CEO inside debt and corporate debt maturity. Theory on inside debt posits
that inside debt aligns managerial incentives with those of debtholders when inside debt
matures after corporate debt and when CEO personal leverage ratio is greater than firm
leverage ratio. Employing these theoretical insights, we develop and test three hypotheses.
We first hypothesize that among firms with long-term inside debt, debt maturity for firms
with debt-biased CEO relative leverage ratios is greater than for firms with equity-biased
CEO relative leverage ratios. We next hypothesize that among firms with debt-biased CEO
relative leverage ratios, debt maturity for firms with long-term inside debt is greater than
for firms with short-term inside debt. Lastly, we hypothesize that among firms with equity-
biased CEO relative leverage ratios, debt maturity for firms with long-term inside debt is
less than for firms with short-term inside debt.
Using a sample of 4,399 new corporate debt issued during 2007-2012, we find signifi-
cant evidence for all the three hypotheses and the evidence is stronger especially for firms
with high market-to-book ratio. These results are consistent with theory on when CEO
debt-like compensation can reduce stockholder-debtholder conflicts. The results are also
consistent with the notion that debtholders recognize not only this incentive alignment, but
also when the alignment is effective to their claims.
While prior research pays great attention to the incentive horizon/duration of man-
agerial equity compensation and to the level of managerial debt compensation, most aca-
demic studies are silent on the maturity effect of managerial debt compensation. Our study
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demonstrates the importance of taking into account inside debt maturity when studying its
incentive alignment role. For future research, it would be interesting to study whether and
how the incentive horizon of CEO inside debt is linked to other corporate policies.
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4. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I examine two contracting mechanisms that can possibly help overcome
frictions among economic agents in corporate finance. In particular, I analyze the eco-
nomic mechanism underlying the renegotiation of bank debt contracts that occurs outside
of states of distress or default. I also investigate the incentive alignment effect of CEO
debt compensation on the maturity choice of corporate debt issues.
In the first essay, I empirically examine why renegotiations of bank loan agreements
occur voluntarily outside of any sort of default. I find a statistically and economically
significant bondholder reaction to renegotiations that relax covenant strictness. This result
supports the Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009) model, where banks are willing to transfer sub-
stantial control rights back to firms when firms have less opportunities of wealth transfer-
ring from bondholders to stockholders. At the same time, this result rejects the possibility
that renegotiations when firms have strong bargaining power could hurt bondholders. I
find little evidence that renegotiated increase of bank loan interest rate leads to negative
bondholders’ reaction as implied by Gorton and Kahn (2000). This is explained by the
evidence that firms become more conservative in making investment decisions after such
renegotiations, although increased loan spread usually indicates the deterioration of firms’
credit quality.
This study also provides guidance for future research. I provide strong support for the
economic mechanism proposed in Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009). That is, loosening strict
covenant over time is a way that “good-type” firms use to mitigate financing frictions from
asymmetric information between creditors and firms. However, it is still unclear what the
nature of the friction is. In other words, is it due to asset substitution, debt overhang,
or inefficient liquidation? For example, in Myers (1977), that renegotiation breakdowns
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generate debt overhang is central to his original analysis (see also Hart and Moore (1995),
Bhattacharya and Faure-Grimaud (2001), and Tirole (2010)). Hence, it would be interest-
ing to examine whether bank loan renegotiation helps mitigate underinvestment problems,
and if so, to what extent.
In the second essay, co-authored with Shane Johnson and Jun Zhang, we investigate
the incentive alignment effect of CEO’s inside debt on corporate debt maturity choice.
Theory on inside debt posits that inside debt aligns managerial incentives more with those
of debtholders when CEO personal leverage ratio is greater than firm leverage ratio and
when inside debt matures after risky corporate debt. In our empirical analysis, we take
into account the two facets of inside debt. First, our estimates indicate that among firms
with long-term inside debt, debt maturity for firms with debt-biased CEO relative lever-
age ratios is greater than for firms with equity-biased CEO relative leverage ratios; this
captures the debt vs. equity bias dimension of inside debt among firms for which inside
debt maturity is long enough to matter. Second, we find that among firms with debt-biased
CEO relative leverage ratios, debt maturity for firms with long-term inside debt is greater
than for firms with short-term inside debt; this evidence captures the importance of the
inside debt maturity dimension among the set of firms whose CEOs should have a debt
bias. Third, we find that among firms with equity-biased CEO relative leverage ratios,
debt maturity for firms with long-term inside debt is less than for firms with short-term
inside debt; this evidence captures the point that stockholder-debtholder conflicts should
be greater for firms with long-term inside debt levels that are equity biased.
While prior research pays great attention to the incentive horizon/duration of man-
agerial equity compensation and to the level of managerial debt compensation, the ma-
turity effect of managerial debt compensation has received limited attention. Our study
demonstrates the importance of taking into account inside debt maturity when studying its
incentive roles in corporate policies.
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APPENDIX A
TABLES FOR SECTION 2
Table A.1: Sample construction
N
Keep public non-financial firms over the 2002-2012 period that
(1) have qualified publicly traded bonds in the TRACE Enhanced dataset;
Bonds are qualified if they have fixed- and nonzero-coupon rate, are non-convertible
debentures or medium term notes, with nonmissing information on bond rating, issue
size, and maturity
(2) have loan deals in Dealscan that have associated private credit agreements from SEC filings.
Each deal needs to have information on the loan amount, the interest spread, and
the maturity of all tranches in the deal;
Pre-2006 private credit agreements sample is from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) and the rest
is collected using their text-search algorithm from SEC filings.
Identify the first renegotiation for each loan agreement that happens since July, 2002
from 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K filings of the borrowing firms from the loan origination to the
earlier of the maturity of the loan or the end of 2012.
Drop renegotiations whose filings contain confounding events. 599
Confounding events: other loans or other loans’ amendments, covenant violations,
M&As, asset sales/purchases, new bond issuances, share repurchases, DIP financing,
default, and bankruptcy.
Bond event study requirements
Liquidity–a bond trades on at least three of the twenty days prior
to the renegotiation announcement date 418
Prices are available within a five-day window on both sides of the event date 352
Construct firm-level control variables 321
N. of firms 243
N. of loans 321
N. of bonds 807
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Table A.2: Sample descriptive statistics
The table reports summary statistics on firm characteristics, including public debt
issues that are used in bond event study, on loan contract characteristics included
in my renegotiation sample, and on macroeconomic variables. Firm characteristics
are computed as an average over the past four quarters before the loan renegotia-
tion. The sample period is from 2002 to 2012. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Mean Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. Std.Dev. N
Firm characteristics
Assets ($ Mil) 6,125 225 1,780 3,418 7,366 36,818 6,761 321
Market value of equity ($ Mil) 3,467 29 780 1,651 3,859 61,531 5,324 321
Book leverage 0.37 0.05 0.25 0.34 0.47 1.21 0.17 321
Market-to-book 1.23 0.65 0.97 1.13 1.37 4.73 0.42 321
Fraction of junk firms 0.65 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.48 321
Number of bonds per firm 2.69 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 16.00 2.51 321
Years to maturity 7.06 1.02 4.79 6.44 8.47 29.68 3.63 321
Bond rating 12.00 4.00 9.00 12.00 15.00 19.00 3.11 321
Loan characteristics
Amount ($ Mil) 1,046 20 350 750 1,300 14,000 1,177 321
Stated maturity (years) 4.52 1.00 3.72 5.00 5.01 7.80 1.24 321
Spread over LIBOR (bps) 177.00 17.00 75.00 175.00 250.00 700.00 110.49 321
Number of tranches 1.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 0.83 321
Number of lenders 14.58 1.00 8.00 13.00 19.00 86.00 9.35 321
Covenant strictness 33.40 0.00 3.12 31.03 56.09 93.33 28.72 321
Coverage ratio covenant dummy 0.72 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 321
Debt to cash flow covenant dummy 0.60 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 321
Debt to balance sheet covenant dummy 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.43 321
Net worth covenant dummy 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 321
Liquidity covenant dummy 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.22 321
Minimum cash flow covenant dummy 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.15 321
Capital expenditure restrictions dummy 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.41 321
Macroeconomic factors
Quarterly GDP growth 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 321
Bank leverage 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.01 321
Quarterly stock market return 0.02 -0.26 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.29 0.08 321
Bank competition 0.75 -0.64 0.40 1.03 1.18 1.49 0.64 321
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Table A.3: Renegotiation outcomes
The table presents summary statistics on renegotiation outcomes for the 321 loans issued
by 243 firms, focusing on amount, maturity, interest spread, and financial covenants. Panel
A presents the distribution of loans based on items that are renegotiated. Panel B presents
the distribution of the renegotiation outcomes for each item. Panel C presents summary
statistics on the percentage change of each item via renegotiation. Except for covenant
strictness, the percentage change is defined as the change of item value divided by the
pre-renegotiation item value. For the covenant strictness measure, since its value can be
close to zero, I use only the change of covenant strictness, defined as the difference of the
covenant strictness after renegotiation and the covenant strictness before renegotiation.
Following Denis and Wang (2013), if a new individual covenant is added, the percentage
change is recorded as 100% if the covenant sets the lower bound, or -100% if the covenant
sets the upper bound. If a covenant is removed, the percentage change is recorded as -
100% if the covenant sets the lower bound or 100% if the covenant sets the upper bound.
Panel D presents absolute value of the percentage change conditional on whether the item
is tightened or loosened via renegotiation.
Panel A: Distribution of renegotiations
% of Loans Number of Loans




Interest spread 43.93 141
Financial covenants
Coverage ratio 9.35 30
Debt to cash flow 15.58 50
Debt to balance sheet 3.43 11
Net worth 4.98 16
Liquidity 0.00 0
Minimum cash flow 0.62 2
Capital expenditure 4.98 16
N. of loans 321
N. of firms 243
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Table A.3 Continued
Panel B: Item renegotiation outcomes
Item tightened Item relaxed
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Amount 53 40.77 77 59.23
Maturity 47 34.81 88 65.19
Interest spread 48 34.04 93 65.96
Coverage ratio 3 8.82 31 91.18
Debt to cash flow 13 22.41 45 77.59
Debt to balance sheet 6 54.55 5 45.45
Net worth 13 81.25 3 18.75
Minimum cash flow 1 50.00 1 50.00
Capital expenditure 4 25.00 12 75.00
Covenant strictness 17 25.37 50 74.63
Panel C: Percentage change of loan terms
N Mean Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. Std.Dev
Amount 130 13.65 -92.94 -25.00 13.39 40.00 333.33 61.43
Maturity 135 16.67 -80.05 -4.38 1.64 33.30 299.27 47.53
Interest spread 141 19.14 -62.50 -30.00 -14.29 5.66 757.14 114.24
Coverage ratio 34 -32.58 -100.00 -100.00 -25.00 -9.09 100.00 56.30
Debt to cash flow 58 9.68 -100.00 5.26 12.92 28.57 100.00 53.82
Debt to balance sheet 11 6.19 -100.00 -16.67 -4.17 100.00 100.00 70.77
Net worth 16 76.14 -100.00 1.96 18.02 70.96 931.58 236.13
Minimum cash flow 2 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 141.42
Capital expenditure 16 12.33 -100.00 -10.00 23.70 50.00 100.00 64.09
Covenant strictness 67 9.87 -40.61 -0.65 8.56 23.47 47.40 19.69
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Table A.3 Continued
Panel D: Percentage change in absolute value of loan terms by direction
Item tightened Item relaxed
Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median Min. Max.
Amount 37.93 32.31 0.21 92.94 49.15 33.33 2.60 333.33
Maturity 19.35 14.64 0.01 80.05 35.90 23.95 0.00 299.27
Interest spread 106.56 25.17 0.01 757.14 25.97 25.00 0.56 62.50
Coverage ratio 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 45.41 28.57 4.17 100.00
Debt to cash flow 64.62 100.00 6.06 100.00 31.15 15.38 4.35 100.00
Debt to balance sheet 39.99 13.33 4.17 100.00 61.61 100.00 3.45 100.00
Net worth 111.15 38.00 0.60 931.58 75.56 100.00 26.67 100.00
Minimum cash flow 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Capital expenditure 82.50 100.00 30.00 100.00 43.94 43.18 10.00 100.00
Covenant strictness 14.37 9.67 0.65 40.61 18.11 12.78 0.35 47.40
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Table A.4: Abnormal bond returns around renegotiation announcement dates
The table presents the firm-level abnormal bond return (in basis points) for the full sample
over the period 2002-2012 and for various groupings. Abnormal bond returns are calcu-
lated over the event window [-5,5] around the dates of renegotiation announcement. The
firm-level bond abnormal return is value-weighted averages across individual bonds within
a firm, where the weights are based on the market value of each bond on the last trading
day within five days prior to the announcement day. Panel A presents the full sample dis-
tribution of both raw and winsorized abnormal bond returns. Winsorization is conducted
at 1% and 99% as well as 5% and 95%. Panel B presents, for abnormal bond returns
winsorized at 5% and 95%, means, medians, and the differences in means and medians
across subsamples grouped by either firm credit rating or by whether one of the four terms
is modified: covenants, interest spread, amount, and maturity. The significance level of the
mean is based on t-test, the significance level of the difference in means is based on t-test,
assuming unequal variance across groups. The significance of the median is based on two
tests: a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and a sign test. The significance level of the difference
in medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test and a nonparametric equality-of-medians
test. p-value are reported for all the tests.
Panel A: Sample distribution
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis N
Bond abnormal return -31.67 -46.92 -0.60 48.12 322.95 -7.18 65.69 321
Bond abnormal return, w. 1% -15.36 -46.92 -0.60 48.12 178.27 -3.02 18.89 321
Bond abnormal return, w. 5% -2.22 -46.92 -0.60 48.12 90.68 -0.27 2.90 321
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Table A.4 Continued








Full sample 321 -2.22 -0.60 0.66 1.06 0.91
Subsample comparison
Investment-grade 112 9.80 16.15 0.25 1.95 0.05
Speculative-grade 209 -8.67 -5.50 0.17 0.16 0.10
Difference -18.46 -21.64 0.08 0.01 0.00
Covenant loosened 50 8.29 22.69 0.58 1.59 0.32
Covenant tightened 17 -43.10 -41.10 0.12 0.11 0.05
Difference -51.39 -63.80 0.10 0.06 0.01
Spread increased 48 -21.44 -15.59 0.12 0.21 0.31
Spread decreased 94 4.51 0.47 0.62 1.38 1.00
Difference 25.95 16.06 0.12 0.18 0.29
Amount increased 77 3.96 0.46 0.67 1.34 0.82
Amount decreased 53 -7.61 -3.00 0.49 0.63 0.78
Difference -11.57 -3.46 0.42 0.46 0.59
Maturity increased 88 -0.84 0.60 0.93 1.27 1.00
Maturity decreased 49 -12.39 -12.25 0.29 0.35 0.78
Difference -11.55 -12.85 0.44 0.38 0.64
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Table A.5: Regression analysis of abnormal bond returns
The table presents regression analysis of the abnormal bond returns in 321 bank loan
renegotiations around the dates of renegotiation announcements over the period 2002-
2012. The change of covenant strictness (∆Covenant) is multiplied by negative one so
that the positive coefficient estimate directly represents the effect of loosening covenants.
Panel A reports results for three different estimation methods: OLS, robust regression, and
simultaneous-quantile regressions with estimates at 25%, 50%, and 75% quantiles. The
dependent variable is the firm-level abnormal bond return, expressed in basis points. For
the median and robust regressions, abnormal bond returns are unwinsorized, and for OLS
abnormal bond returns are winsorized at 5% and 95%. Panel B reports robust regression
results for a specification that extends the one in panel A by adding three individual-level
firm bargaining power proxies: lender capitalization, the number of lending relationships
in the past four loans before renegotiation, and a dummy variable indicating whether the
borrow has access to commercial paper markets. Each proxy is interacted with ∆Covenant.
All continuous control variables are standardized over the full sample, except that the four
contractual term change variables are standardized conditional on each being modified.
All regressions control for year and Fama-French 12-industry fixed effects. For OLS,
standard errors are clustered at firm-level. For quantile regression, standard errors are
obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. ***, **,
and *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
89
Table A.5 Continued
Panel A: Dependent variable-abnormal bond returns
OLS Robust Regression Simultaneous-Quantile Regression
p25 p50 p75
Loan term changes
∆Covenant strictness 33.822*** 49.727*** 41.087** 49.926*** 39.619*
(0.008) (0.000) (0.018) (0.002) (0.068)
∆Spread -7.806 -18.348** 1.282 -19.037 -23.891
(0.491) (0.021) (0.949) (0.242) (0.194)
∆Maturity 1.771 3.551 -0.505 3.639 10.936
(0.797) (0.644) (0.962) (0.674) (0.300)
∆Amount 8.144 7.942 16.447 5.452 5.004
(0.246) (0.316) (0.116) (0.499) (0.621)
Firm characteristics
Speculative-grade -20.239* -31.565*** -16.208 -30.863** -42.286**
(0.098) (0.007) (0.452) (0.035) (0.015)
Log of book asset 2.684 -2.370 11.241 -3.859 -5.388
(0.660) (0.666) (0.251) (0.606) (0.527)
Market-to-book -7.792 -8.343 -14.900 -1.997 -5.841
(0.128) (0.115) (0.152) (0.816) (0.430)
Macroeconomic factors
Bank leverage 17.308 13.119 14.863 -4.964 40.836
(0.465) (0.497) (0.706) (0.871) (0.284)
Stock market return 5.022 3.272 3.903 -0.014 11.285
(0.521) (0.584) (0.780) (0.999) (0.356)
GDP growth -15.970** -9.277 -5.280 -8.632 -21.593*
(0.036) (0.214) (0.697) (0.387) (0.078)
Bank competition 2.337 9.055 8.857 2.056 -8.341
(0.875) (0.479) (0.699) (0.910) (0.697)
Constant -5.769 24.941 -52.670 80.821 4.099
(0.920) (0.555) (0.622) (0.291) (0.977)
Observations 321 321 321
(Pseudo) R2 0.114 0.198 0.055
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Table A.5 Continued
Panel B: Individual-level bargaining power proxies
(1) (2) (3)
Loan term changes
∆Covenant strictness 40.834*** 44.080*** 47.330***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Spread -17.023** -16.342** -17.687**
(0.034) (0.045) (0.030)
∆Maturity 2.472 3.826 1.644
(0.751) (0.626) (0.838)
∆Amount 9.250 8.273 9.973
(0.249) (0.308) (0.242)
∆Covenant strictness interacted with
N. of lender relationships -15.245*
(0.097)




Individual bargaining power proxy
N. of lender relationships 0.222
(0.964)





Speculative-grade -28.515** -32.431** -26.284**
(0.017) (0.012) (0.035)
Log of book asset -1.294 -1.553 -0.039
(0.818) (0.790) (0.995)
Market-to-book -7.874 -8.297 -7.420
(0.142) (0.126) (0.175)
Constant 25.883 26.218 -0.306
(0.544) (0.545) (0.994)
Macroeconomic factors Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319 319 312
(Pseudo) R2 0.175 0.189 0.178
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Table A.6: Further analysis of the effect of spread change via loan renegotiation
Panel A repeats the analysis of panel A, Table A.5, but replaces abnormal bond returns by
stock cumulative abnormal returns (CAR in %) over [-5,5] window as the dependent vari-
able. Panel B reports OLS regressions of investment intensity on lagged stock volatility,
conditional on the change of loan spread. The dependent variable in panel B is firm-level
quarterly investment for the next four quarters after renegotiation, scaled by PP&E at the
beginning of each quarter. Three types of investment are used: total investment (capital
expenditure+R&D), capital expenditure (Capex), and research and development expense
(R&D). In panel A, all continuous variables are standardized as in Table 4. All regressions
in panel A control for Fama-French 12-industry and year fixed effects, while regressions
in panel B control for Fama-French 12-industry and calendar quarter fixed effects. For
OLS, standard errors are clustered by firm in panel A and clustered by firm and by calen-
dar quarter in panel B. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. ***, **, and *, indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A.6 Continued
Panel A: Dependent variable–Stock CAR (in %)
OLS Robust Regression Simultaneous-Quantile Regression
p25 p50 p75
Loan term changes
∆Covenant strictness 1.226** 1.279* 1.119 0.787 1.513
(0.034) (0.059) (0.158) (0.376) (0.125)
∆Spread 1.601*** 1.731*** 1.756* 1.840* 1.415
(0.001) (0.001) (0.081) (0.063) (0.193)
∆Maturity 0.327 0.368 0.004 -0.207 1.064
(0.498) (0.454) (0.997) (0.816) (0.152)
∆Amount 0.062 0.137 -0.338 0.797 -0.063
(0.877) (0.789) (0.677) (0.286) (0.919)
Firm characteristics
Speculative-grade -0.035 -0.241 -1.626 -0.222 0.120
(0.959) (0.746) (0.183) (0.826) (0.895)
Market-to-book -0.124 -0.014 -0.091 0.135 -0.070
(0.720) (0.967) (0.881) (0.799) (0.888)
Log of book asset -0.282 -0.242 -0.474 -0.123 -0.793
(0.403) (0.490) (0.404) (0.804) (0.117)
Macroeconomic factors
Bank leverage -0.425 -0.344 -0.885 0.126 -0.456
(0.726) (0.782) (0.671) (0.943) (0.773)
Stock market return -0.048 0.006 0.028 -0.124 -0.201
(0.895) (0.987) (0.961) (0.820) (0.747)
GDP growth -0.669 -0.538 0.004 -0.219 -0.576
(0.137) (0.258) (0.996) (0.729) (0.414)
Bank competition -0.525 -0.081 -1.273 0.376 -0.968
(0.514) (0.922) (0.362) (0.754) (0.410)
Constant -0.521 -0.869 -3.601 -0.427 2.638
(0.847) (0.747) (0.535) (0.920) (0.605)
Observations 319 319 319
(Pseudo) R2 0.162 0.133 0.070
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Table A.6 Continued
Panel B: Regressions of investment on stock volatility
Total investment Capex R&D
Stock volatility
(Spread increased group) -0.024 -0.017* -0.007
(0.111) (0.074) (0.520)
Stock volatility
(Spread unchanged group) -0.007 -0.003 -0.006
(0.632) (0.771) (0.553)
Stock volatility
(Spread decreased group) -0.011 0.004 -0.017
(0.559) (0.731) (0.204)
∆Spread 0.001 0.003** -0.002
(0.483) (0.024) (0.384)
∆Covenant strictness -0.000 -0.000** 0.000
(0.497) (0.035) (0.360)
∆Maturity 0.006 -0.002 0.008*
(0.403) (0.652) (0.068)
∆Amount 0.009* 0.010** -0.002
(0.061) (0.012) (0.248)
Log of book asset -0.000 -0.002 0.002
(0.954) (0.231) (0.261)
Market-to-book 0.037*** 0.021*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Leverage -0.024 -0.018 -0.004
(0.148) (0.124) (0.746)
Cash flow 0.031*** 0.032*** -0.005
(0.001) (0.000) (0.196)
Cash holding 0.012** -0.000 0.012**
(0.043) (0.963) (0.024)
Constant -0.013 0.022 -0.035*
(0.603) (0.209) (0.058)
Observations 1137 1137 1137
R2 0.366 0.455 0.284
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Table A.7: Asymmetric effects of changes of covenant strictness and interest spread
The table presents coefficient estimates for asymmetric effects of the change of covenant
strictness (Panel A) and the change of loan interest spread (Panel B) on firm-level abnormal
bond returns (in basis points). Loosen (Tighten) covenant is the positive (negative) com-
ponent of the change of covenant strictness, in absolute value form. Decrease (Increase)
spread is the negative (positive) component of the percentage change of loan spread. OLS,
robust regression, and quantile regressions with estimates at 25%, 50%, and 75% are re-
ported. For OLS, standard errors are clustered by firm. For quantile regressions, standard
errors are obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications. All firm-level continuous explanatory
variables are standardized over the full sample. The four contract change variables are
standardized conditional on each being modified. All regressions control for Fama-French
12-industry and year fixed effects. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. ***, **, and *,
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A.7 Continued
Panel A: Loosen vs. tighten covenants
OLS Robust Regression Simultaneous-Quantile Regression
p25 p50 p75
Loan term changes
Loosen covenant 26.242* 40.462*** 25.327 44.695** 32.953
(0.093) (0.002) (0.281) (0.011) (0.172)
Tighten covenant -0.847 1.371 -12.514 -3.739 22.172
(0.970) (0.951) (0.755) (0.937) (0.675)
∆Maturity 2.990 2.686 2.943 4.431 12.373
(0.699) (0.736) (0.821) (0.661) (0.265)
∆Amount 7.096 8.895 15.685 5.055 5.955
(0.316) (0.278) (0.202) (0.591) (0.544)
∆Spread -7.065 -18.056** 7.461 -18.815 -15.027
(0.536) (0.027) (0.728) (0.249) (0.426)
Firm characteristics
Speculative-grade -21.996* -31.841*** -32.935 -36.568** -36.777**
(0.081) (0.009) (0.155) (0.022) (0.028)
Log of book asset 0.935 -2.345 7.338 -4.063 -4.575
(0.882) (0.676) (0.484) (0.592) (0.607)
Market-to-book -6.896 -6.910 -10.007 -2.827 -5.488
(0.178) (0.205) (0.358) (0.737) (0.415)
Macroeconomic factors
GDP growth -15.568* -9.907 -5.249 -3.262 -21.396*
(0.051) (0.201) (0.706) (0.746) (0.076)
Stock market return 5.229 2.590 4.774 1.519 11.811
(0.513) (0.675) (0.751) (0.875) (0.304)
Bank leverage 16.438 15.459 19.903 13.328 44.437
(0.484) (0.437) (0.626) (0.673) (0.231)
Bank competition -0.045 8.042 8.177 0.185 0.966
(0.998) (0.541) (0.757) (0.993) (0.965)
Constant -2.550 23.149 -52.424 42.858 16.714
(0.965) (0.595) (0.648) (0.577) (0.907)
Observations 321 321 321
(Pseudo) R2 0.100 0.159 0.047
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Table A.7 Continued
Panel B: Increase vs. decrease spread
OLS Robust Regression Simultaneous-Quantile Regression
p25 p50 p75
Loan term changes
Decrease spread -2.575 -7.325 -26.237* -11.850 13.054
(0.796) (0.430) (0.071) (0.334) (0.341)
Increase spread -4.361 -15.476 -0.145 -15.614 -12.808
(0.826) (0.244) (0.996) (0.616) (0.713)
∆Covenant strictness 33.471*** 48.750*** 35.957** 47.569*** 41.338*
(0.008) (0.000) (0.032) (0.004) (0.061)
∆Maturity 2.097 4.287 0.920 4.191 15.876
(0.771) (0.584) (0.930) (0.659) (0.156)
∆Amount 8.441 8.478 20.056* 5.441 1.238
(0.230) (0.290) (0.061) (0.499) (0.902)
Firm characteristics
Speculative-grade -20.546 -33.407*** -25.757 -36.128** -43.478***
(0.102) (0.005) (0.249) (0.016) (0.009)
Log of book asset 2.074 -2.878 11.438 -3.750 -5.588
(0.734) (0.605) (0.221) (0.613) (0.512)
Market-to-book -7.904 -9.060* -10.891 -5.674 -6.222
(0.127) (0.091) (0.280) (0.499) (0.337)
Macroeconomic factors
GDP growth -16.069** -9.745 -6.382 -4.870 -17.254
(0.033) (0.196) (0.638) (0.619) (0.145)
Stock market return 5.155 3.492 -0.146 -0.184 3.135
(0.511) (0.563) (0.991) (0.985) (0.791)
Bank leverage 18.929 16.078 -2.153 7.217 40.890
(0.425) (0.408) (0.955) (0.818) (0.268)
Bank competition 2.781 10.101 6.535 9.200 -16.466
(0.852) (0.435) (0.763) (0.595) (0.462)
Constant -9.380 9.129 -22.177 50.960 -3.970
(0.870) (0.830) (0.832) (0.511) (0.977)
Observations 321 321 321
(Pseudo) R2 0.112 0.178 0.052
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Table A.8: Further robustness tests
The table presents additional robustness tests. Panel A reports results for the subsample of
bank loan renegotiations that are not followed by covenant violation in the upcoming year.
Panel B reports results that control for earning announcements (if any) within the [-5,5]
event window. All firm-level continuous explanatory variables are standardized over the
full sample. The four contract change variables are standardized conditional on each being
modified. All regressions control for Fama-French 12-industry and year fixed effects. For
OLS, standard errors are clustered by firm. For quantile regressions, standard errors are
obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. ***, **,
and *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: No covenant violation in the upcoming year
OLS Robust Regression Simultaneous-Quantile Regression
p25 p50 p75
Loan term changes
∆Covenant strictness 40.036*** 48.993*** 42.190** 46.032*** 37.089**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.017)
∆Spread -10.632 -14.960* -2.404 -22.596 -25.946*
(0.391) (0.066) (0.896) (0.144) (0.099)
∆Maturity -1.820 0.243 -4.658 5.880 8.801
(0.773) (0.975) (0.590) (0.490) (0.433)
∆Amount 8.209 4.653 15.779 2.801 4.058
(0.301) (0.567) (0.149) (0.748) (0.729)
Firm characteristics
Speculative-grade -18.381 -34.492*** 1.033 -36.806** -36.294**
(0.142) (0.004) (0.961) (0.013) (0.033)
Log of book asset 4.143 -1.432 14.121 -6.039 -3.281
(0.518) (0.799) (0.179) (0.397) (0.715)
Market-to-book -8.556 -8.401 -12.263 -1.280 -5.286
(0.103) (0.123) (0.254) (0.881) (0.422)
Macroeconomic factors
Bank leverage 25.933 10.960 11.031 11.116 45.058
(0.285) (0.580) (0.792) (0.748) (0.250)
Stock market return 5.743 4.491 4.821 2.653 10.588
(0.490) (0.466) (0.712) (0.778) (0.393)
GDP growth -16.458** -9.317 -3.337 -5.776 -23.392*
(0.035) (0.221) (0.803) (0.566) (0.089)
Bank competition 9.202 7.900 9.591 12.506 4.126
(0.539) (0.549) (0.702) (0.555) (0.842)
Constant -2.896 39.877 -73.332 65.855 2.638
(0.962) (0.363) (0.552) (0.332) (0.984)
Observations 309 309 309
(Pseudo) R2 0.110 0.167 0.051
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Table A.8 Continued
Panel B: Control for earning announcements
OLS Robust Regression Simultaneous-Quantile Regression
p25 p50 p75
Loan term changes
∆Covenant strictness 35.796*** 50.411*** 43.598** 50.511*** 42.630**
(0.003) (0.000) (0.015) (0.002) (0.045)
∆Spread -4.525 -8.069 1.937 -12.315 -16.031
(0.675) (0.312) (0.911) (0.374) (0.314)
∆Maturity -0.081 3.176 -4.704 3.814 10.576
(0.991) (0.677) (0.656) (0.675) (0.307)
∆Amount 7.564 7.067 14.295 5.486 5.628
(0.336) (0.374) (0.235) (0.535) (0.595)
Firm characteristics
Speculative-grade -19.332 -31.344*** -4.653 -31.297** -45.470***
(0.110) (0.008) (0.833) (0.027) (0.008)
Log of book asset 2.142 -2.564 12.993 -4.497 -5.857
(0.721) (0.646) (0.181) (0.515) (0.507)
Market-to-book -8.487 -9.871* -13.024 -3.452 -8.486
(0.110) (0.066) (0.188) (0.669) (0.173)
Earnings announcement dummy 14.699 14.621 -3.737 9.750 10.855
(0.268) (0.228) (0.834) (0.493) (0.543)
Macroeconomic factors
Bank leverage 18.461 16.090 7.007 3.832 50.878
(0.435) (0.410) (0.859) (0.903) (0.164)
Stock market return 5.803 4.326 0.886 2.021 9.589
(0.452) (0.475) (0.950) (0.828) (0.399)
GDP growth -15.981** -10.878 -8.475 -7.556 -22.342*
(0.035) (0.149) (0.544) (0.426) (0.058)
Bank competition 2.419 7.871 6.245 4.922 -6.947
(0.870) (0.542) (0.780) (0.795) (0.759)
Constant -7.983 8.320 -52.337 67.210 -8.587
(0.889) (0.845) (0.636) (0.400) (0.951)
Observations 321 321 321
(Pseudo) R2 0.120 0.182 0.055
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ESTIMATION OF COVENANT STRICTNESS
For the sake of completeness, I reproduce in this appendix the methodology as intro-
duced in Murfin (2012) on the estimation of his covenant strictness measure.
As mentioned above, this new metrics estimates the probability that the lender will
receive contingent control upon a covenant violation by the borrower. To better illustrate
the idea, consider a loan that contains only a single financial covenant that set a minimum
threshold r on the underlying financial ratio r. r, after experiencing a normally-distributed
shock ε ∼ N(0,σ2) in the period after the origination of the loan, becomes
r′ = r+ ε.
When r′ < r, the covenant for r is violated, which allocates control to the lender.
Therefore, the ex ante probability of lender receiving contingent control via a covenant
violation is Pr(r+ ε < r), which leads to
p = 1−Φ(r− r
σ
),
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Now this basic frame-
work can be generalized to a multivariate setting to incorporate cases where there are
multiple covenants in a loan.
Specifically, assuming that there are N (N >= 1) financial covenants in a loan contract
and the underlying financial ratio vector is denoted as r′ = r+ε , where ε is N-dimensional
shock that follows the multivariate normal distribution N(0,Σ). Given the covenant thresh-
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old vector r, the probability of having no technical default for a loan with N covenants is
Pr(r′ > r), which is equal to the multivariate normal CDF evaluated at r− r: ΦN(r− r).
Then the ex ante probability of lender control, i.e. convenant strictness, is just the comple-
ment of ΦN(r− r): 1−ΦN(r− r). Therefore, the contract strictness measure incorporates
not only the number of covenants r, but also takes into account of the financial slack r− r,
and the variance-covariance matrix associated with the changes of financial ratios, Σ.
Two inputs are needed for the estimation of the covenant strictness measure: r− r and
Σ. I use Compustat quarterly data to construct both inputs. Specifically, slack is mea-
sured as the absolute log difference between the observed ratio and the allowable covenant
threshold. Because my goal is to measure the change of covenant strictness via loan rene-
gotiation, the slack in the last quarter prior to the renegotiation and the slack in the first
period after renegotiation are separately applied to the calculation. With respect to Σ, I
estimate it for each one-digit SIC industry, using 10-year windows of backward-looking
quarterly changes in the natural logged financial ratios of levered Compustat firms.
As Murfin (2012), I include the following covenants in the calculation of contract
strictness: minimum cash flow to debt, current ratio, quick ratio, tangible net worth, total
net worth, minimum cash flow, fixed charge coverage, interest coverage, debt to total
capitalization, debt to tangible net worth, and capital expenditure. These covenants capture
the majority of the DealScan loan database and the associated financial ratios are defined
in Appendix B. Note that, for covenants that are related to cash flow or income measures,
these are calculated on a rolling four-quarter basis.
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APPENDIX D
TABLES FOR SECTION 3
Table D.1: Distribution of corporate debt issues
The sample contains 4,399 debt issues by firms in the ExecuComp database taking places
between 2007 and 2012 and being reported by Thomson One. The sample contains four
types of issues: Rule 144A debt, non-Rule 144A debt, public issues, and syndicated loans.
Panel A report the distribution of debt issues across time and issue types. Panel B reports
summary statistics for maturity and principal amount and pairwise comparison of maturity
across issue types. ***, **, and *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Distribution by year and debt type
Issue Type
Year Number of Issues Rule 144A Non-Rule 144A Public Syndicated
2007 698 16 36 255 391
2008 641 9 35 240 357
2009 582 16 33 216 317
2010 906 2 26 326 552
2011 1059 - 38 282 739
2012 513 - 28 211 274
2007-12 4399 43 196 1530 2630
111
Table D.1 Continued
Panel B: Maturity and volume by debt type
Maturity (years) Amount ($ MM)
Mean Median Mean Median
All Issues 7.119 5.008 629.451 369.291
(1) Rule 144A 7.721 7.104 478.843 331.943
(2) Non-Rule 144A 11.358 10.011 87.741 64.868
(3) Public 11.627 10.019 585.085 450.061
(4) Syndicated 4.171 5.005 698.095 334.155








Table D.2: Descriptive statistics and correlations
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample observations (Panel A) and Pearson
correlations for our variables of interest and the dependent variable (Panel B). In Panel B,
p-values are provided in parentheses. The sample contains 4,399 new debt issues made by
892 firms in the ExecuComp database from 2007 to 2012 where data is available to com-
pute CEO inside debt and compensation incentives and where accounting data is available
on Compustat. The sample starts in 2007 because SEC started to require firms to report
executive deferred compensation plans and pension benefits in 2006 and we match each
issue with its corresponding firm’s financial information in Compustat at the latest fiscal
year end before the issue date. Financial firms are excluded from the sample. All continu-
ous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variables expressed in dollar
value are deflated by the all-urban CPI (year 2006). All Variable definitions are provided
in Appendix E.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. N
Inside debt($000s) 9587.628 354.031 3643.479 12353.053 14088.077 4,399
Pension($1000s) 5176.531 0.000 582.539 7560.122 8241.022 4,397
Deferred compensation($1000s) 4391.568 0.000 913.133 3522.067 8911.984 4,399
Equity holdings($1000s) 64480.624 9529.096 22801.854 50874.215 149490.623 4,399
Stock holdings($1000s) 44764.753 3795.891 9692.296 25342.973 141865.030 4,399
Option holdings($1000s) 18592.388 2383.998 8868.655 23608.357 26041.540 4,399
Cashcomp($1000s) 1191.238 738.268 949.967 1232.572 895.973 4,399
DE 0.392 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.488 4,399
DE Ratio 1.526 0.048 0.589 1.977 2.257 4,399
Short 0.214 0 0 0 0.410 4,399
Log(delta) 5.827 4.958 5.870 6.806 1.445 4,399
Log(vega) 4.270 3.274 4.672 5.743 1.978 4,399
Own 0.011 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.033 4,399
CEO age 55.770 52.000 56.000 60.000 6.274 4,329
CEO tenure 7.279 3.000 6.000 9.000 5.963 4,398
Leverage 0.189 0.088 0.160 0.264 0.132 4,399
LT3 0.659 0.526 0.714 0.883 0.282 4,399
Sale ($ MM) 17897.055 1526.036 4676.281 14550.291 42488.871 4,399
M/B 1.710 1.194 1.472 1.987 0.767 4,399
Asset Mat 12.256 3.559 8.518 17.575 11.230 4,399
Abn Earn 0.013 -0.013 0.005 0.019 0.251 4,399
Std Ret 0.054 0.031 0.048 0.068 0.032 4,399
Term 1.992 0.760 2.160 3.100 1.388 4,399
Reg Dum 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.302 4,399
NOL Dum 0.464 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 4,399
Not Rated 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 4,399
Investment Grade 0.626 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.484 4,399




Variables Maturity DE Ratio DE Log(delta) Log(vega) Own
Maturity 1.00
DE Ratio 0.06 1.00
(0.00)
DE 0.10 0.70 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Log(delta) 0.12 -0.02 0.02 1.00
(0.00) (0.30) (0.30)
Log(vega) 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.59 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Own -0.05 -0.15 -0.19 0.31 -0.11 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO age 0.04 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.06
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm age 0.12 0.23 0.32 0.09 0.22 -0.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IssueAmount -0.07 0.10 0.11 0.23 0.22 -0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(sale) 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.49 0.51 -0.17
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
M/B 0.02 0.22 0.17 0.32 0.12 0.04
(0.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
leverage -0.01 -0.31 -0.22 -0.16 -0.09 -0.02
(0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26)
LT3 0.09 -0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.03 -0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
Asset Mat 0.13 -0.00 0.07 -0.12 -0.17 -0.04
(0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Reg Dum 0.12 0.00 0.11 -0.18 -0.14 -0.08
(0.00) (0.93) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Abn Earn -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.13 -0.07 -0.02
(0.72) (0.03) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23)
Std Ret -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07 -0.15 0.15
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Not Rated -0.13 -0.04 -0.09 -0.21 -0.23 0.12
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investment Grade 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.12 -0.05
(0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Zscore Dum -0.04 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.04




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table D.6: Bias-corrected nearest neighbor matching estimator
This table presents the effect of incentive bias change on the maturity of new debt
issues, while holding the incentive horizon type the same (or vice versa). We employ
a matched firm, difference-in-difference approach. Column titled “N” reports the
number of matched pairs. Sample average treatment effect (SATE) is reported in the
last column. The sample is constructed as described in Table D.2 and covers the 2007
to 2012 period. p-value (in parentheses) are based on heteroskedastic-robust standard
errors. ***, **, and *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Groups Predicted Sign N SATE
Long-term equity bias⇒ Long-term debt bias
+ 106
2.315***
(DE = 0, Short = 0)⇒ (DE = 1, Short = 0) (0.000)
Long-term debt bias⇒ long-term equity bias − 72 -1.487**
(DE = 1, Short = 0)⇒ (DE = 0, Short = 0) (0.003)
Short-term debt bias⇒ long-term debt bias
+ 12
1.738
(DE = 1, Short = 1)⇒ (DE = 1, Short = 0) (0.349)
Long-term debt bias⇒ Short-term debt bias − 14 -1.852
(DE = 1, Short = 0)⇒ (DE = 1, Short = 1) (0.173)
Short-term equity bias⇒ Long-term equity bias − 14 -1.958
(DE = 0, Short = 1)⇒ (DE = 0, Short = 0) (0.497)
Long-term equity bias⇒ Short-term equity bias
+ 17
1.344
(DE = 0, Short = 0)⇒ (DE = 0, Short = 1) (0.291)
122
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COMPUTATION OF OPTION VALUE, DELTA, AND VEGA
We follow the methodology used in Core and Guay (1999) and Edmans, Gabaix, and
Landier (2009) to calculate option value and construct the delta and vega of the managerial
compensation.
The value of a CEO’s option holdings is the sum of the value for the three groups: new
grants in the current year, existing unexercisable grants, and existing exercisable grants.
Before 2006, exercise price is only reported for new option grants in each year. Cer-
tain imputation is needed to calculate exercise price for prior granted options. Starting in
2006 however, Execucomp provides a separate record for each outstanding option tranche,
whose exercise price and expiration date are also reported.
The estimation of a stock option in any group bases on the same Black-Scholes model
for European call options, adjusted for dividends by Merton (1974):
Option value = [Se−dT N(Z)−Xe−rT N(Z−σ
√
T )],
where Z = [ln(S/X)+T (r−d+σ2/2]/(σ√T )], N is the cumulative probability function
for the normal distribution, S is the price of the underlying stock σ is the expected stock-
return volatility over the life of the option, r is the risk-free interest rate, d is expected
dividend yield over the life of the option, T is time to maturity of the option in years,
and X is the exercise price of the option. Among these variables, S, σ , r, and d are
homogeneous at the firm-year level across the three groups of options, while T and X
differ across groups.
Delta is the sensitivity with respect to a 1% change in stock price and a CEO’s portfolio
129
delta is the sum of the deltas for the exercisable and unexercisable options plus the delta
of his shareholdings. The option Delta is defined as:
∂ (optionvalue)/∂ (price)]∗ (price/100) = edT N(Z)∗ (price/100).
The Delta from stock holdings is just the total number of stock holdings multiplied by a
1% change in stock price.
Vega is the sensitivity with respect to a 0.01 change in stock-return volatility. The
option vega is defined as:
∂ (optionvalue)/∂ (stockvolatility)∗0.01 = edT N′(Z)ST (1/2) ∗ (0.01),
where N′ is the normal density function. Following the existing literature (Coles, Daniel,
and Naveen (2006)) that the Vega of any stock-holdings, including restricted stock, is
assumed to be zero, the CEO’s portfolio sensitivity with respect to a 0.01 change in stock-
return volatility is equal to the Vega from his option holdings.
130
